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INTRODUCTION
Space exploration is heating up. Governments and private interests
are on a fast track to develop technologies to send people and equipment
to celestial bodies, like the moon and asteroids, to extract their untapped
resources.1 Near-space is rapidly filling up with public and private
† Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. She thanks Georgetown for its
generous support of her scholarship through the issuance of a summer writing grant.
1. See Andrew R. Brehm, Note, Private Property in Outer Space: Establishing a Foundation for Future Exploration, 33 WIS. INT’L L.J. 353, 354 (2015); Ezra J. Reinstein, Owning
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satellites, causing electromagnetic interference problems and dangerous
space debris from collisions and earlier launches.2 The absence of a
global management system for the private commercial development of
outer space resources will allow these near space problems to be exported
further into the galaxy.3 Moreover, without a governing authority or rules
controlling entry or limiting despoliation, outer space could turn into the
“Wild West” of the twenty-first century.4
Space treaties executed in the last century espoused the principle that
space should be developed for the benefit of all mankind and banned both
private ownership and militarization of space resources.5 But, they left
development of a system for managing non-military activities in outer
space to another day.6 Private commercial interests, which would be
absorbing the risks and paying the high costs of space development,
oppose any management scenario premised on that principle, as it would
enable less developed countries to free ride on their investments. 7 These
interests, unsurprisingly, support privatizing outer space.8 But acceding
to their wishes by establishing a system of property-based rules would
transport Earth’s current division between haves and have-nots into outer
space, and could lead to destabilizing hostilities—the exact consequences
that the early treaty drafters hoped to avoid.9
To date, most scholars in this area have focused on developing
management systems premised on private ownership or possession of the
Outer Space, 20 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 59, 59–60 (1999); Wilbur Ross, That Moon Colony?
Maybe Not Far Off, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2018, at A23.
2. Reinstein, supra note 1, at 64. This area is called the Geo-Stationary Orbit (GSO). Id.
“The GSO is a loop of space about Earth’s equatorial surface,” where most satellites are
placed. Id. This narrow band of space is cluttered with “electromagnetic interference from
rival satellites . . . and with ‘space junk,’ debris from past launches that threatens to rip holes
in the orbiting equipment.” Id. At the same time, the GSO is “the most valuable of all space
resources to date.” Id. at 65. “[T]he private-sector investment in telecommunications satellites
has become a billion-dollar industry.” Carol R. Buxton, Property in Outer Space: The Common Heritage of Mankind Principle vs. the “First in Time, First in Right” Rule of Property
Law, 69 J. AIR L. & COM. 689, 703 (2004).
3. See Reinstein, supra note 1, at 62–63.
4. See id. at 72 (“Any legal regime should guard against inefficient exploitation, waste,
and environmental despoliation. Furthermore, space should not become the next Wild West.
Destruction and sabotage must be discouraged.”).
5. See id. at 62, 66, 69.
6. See id. at 71–72.
7. See id. at 74.
8. See Reinstein, supra note 1, at 72; see also Brehm, supra note 1, at 355.
9. See Buxton, supra note 2, at 700 (“Referring to the ‘first in time, first in right’ property principle that dominated the earth for thousands of years, Arthur J. Goldberg, the U.S.
Representative to the United Nations General Assembly stated, ‘[A]s we stand on the threshold of the [S]pace [A]ge, our first responsibility as governments is clear: we must make sure
that man’s earthly conflicts will not be carried into outer space . . . .’”).
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surface of some celestial body.10 This Article explores an alternative
concept, the commons, in which no individual owns the property in
question or can exclude others from it. Viewing property as a commons
is closer to the principles set out in the various space treaties than
implementation of a private property regime, and also offers a workable
property regime. This Article demonstrates these conclusions by showing
similarities between a large, Earth-bound commons, like the ocean and
outer space, and how various commons management scenarios allow
equitable use of resources, while preventing their despoliation and
devolution into hostile disputes over entitlements to them. However, each
of these commons management scenarios is flawed in some way and runs
a similar risk to management approaches for private property of allowing
the resource to be over-used or inequitably distributed.
The public trust doctrine (PTD), an ancient doctrine that
governments and individuals have used effectively for centuries to
protect the public’s interests in terrestrial common pool resources (CPR)
and to fill regulatory gaps, can be helpful in both respects. 11 An
examination of the doctrine identifies commonalities between outer space
and terrestrial public trust resources.12 The ease and low cost of its
implementation and enforcement, as well as its infinite malleability, are
additional reasons to select it as a stopgap measure with some
modification.13
This Article’s structure is straight forward. Part I acquaints the
reader with the problem. It explains why the need to develop a
management regime for space is becoming increasingly critical as
advancing technology is allowing more and more private commercial
interests to play at the edge of outer space with attendant negative
externalities.14 Soon these technological advances will allow private
commercial interests to invade outer space with the potential for similar
adverse impacts.15 Part II examines the international legal framework
governing those activities and finds it lacks any capacity to regulate
10. See, e.g., Brehm supra note 1, at 374; Reinstein, supra note 1, at 72.
11. See Hope M. Babcock, Using the Federal Public Trust Doctrine to Fill Gaps in the
Legal Systems Protecting Migrating Wildlife from the Effects of Climate Change, 95 NEB. L.
REV. 649, 651 (2017).
12. See id. at 651–52.
13. See id. at 678–79.
14. See Ross, supra note 1.
15. See id. (describing touting the creation of a Space Policy Advancing Commercial Enterprise Administration in the Secretary of the Department of Commerce’s office to establish
a one-stop shop to assist “the budding private space sector”); see also Mike Ives, China Makes
Move Into Outer Space, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2018, at A11 (describing China’s ambitious
plans to land an unmanned space craft on the far side of the moon by the end of this year, as
well as put a person on the moon and send a mission to Mars by 2025).
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activities in outer space, in part because it is riddled with ambiguities and
contradictions when it comes to ownership of outer space and its
resources.
Part III turns to that problem by discussing two types of property:
private property and property owned in common with others. It examines
the key features of each as well as their positive and negative attributes,
how each might function in outer space, and what the consequences might
be if one or the other prevailed. Because any property arrangement that
results in its appropriation by the owner and the exclusion of others
violates international space law, Part III also identifies various less-thanfull fee property arrangement, like leases and easements, to see if these
problems can be avoided and concludes they cannot.16 It then examines
property held in common to determine its viability under international
space law and finds it consistent.
Part IV investigates various approaches to managing property in
outer space, be it held in private ownership or in common. Different
approaches for managing private property in space are explored,
including the right of first possession, tradable property claims, and
establishing an exclusive economic zone, as well for managing an open
access commons, such as the application of stewardship principles,
norms, and the PTD. Each approach is evaluated in terms of its
consistency with international law; its ability to promote and protect a
sustainable, equitable, non-monopolistic, non-hostile environment in
outer space; its efficiency; and its cost effectiveness. Only the PTD,
which has been used for centuries to protect the public’s interests in CPRs
and has demonstrated its ability to adapt to new circumstances, may be
able to meet these goals.17 This Article finds commonalities between
outer space and Earth-bound public trust resources, like the oceans.
Additionally, the doctrine’s open access purpose resonates with language
found in international treaties governing activities in outer space.18
This Article concludes that using the PTD will lead to a durable,
equitable management regime in a commons where the wealthy are
neither able to accumulate and control the resources that outer space has
to offer nor over-exploit and deplete them. However, neither the doctrine
nor ownership in common supplies any incentives for development,
which may lead private enterprises to question whether development of
outer space resources is worth the risks and costs.19 But, limited use of

16.
17.
18.
19.

See Brehm, supra note 1, at 360.
See Babcock, supra note 11.
See id. at 678.
See Reinstein, supra note 1, at 61.
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private property management approaches, like lotteries and tradable
development claims—a form of overlapping hybridity between one type
of property, a commons, and a management regime from another, private
property—may fill this gap.20 This Article’s contribution to the literature
on managing outer space resources and commons theory is using the PTD
to bridge the gap between them and to suggest a hybrid management
approach that melds commons theory with private property incentives.
I. OFF TO THE RACES
“As we push human exploration deeper into space, we will unleash the
boundless potential of America’s pioneering commercial space companies.”21

Humans have always looked to the heavens and marveled,
wondering what is there.22 Today, we know more about what might be
there, which has spurred a race among nations and private enterprises to
be the first to reap the economic benefits that outer space may have to
offer.23 This Part introduces the reader to the modern history of that race
and some of the benefits and perils that it presents.
There is not a single definition of exactly what outer space is.24 The
United States employs a functional definition—i.e., outer space exists
“wherever a preordained set of outer space activities takes place,” such
as an orbiting satellite.25 A competing “popular” definition draws “a line
above which everything is considered to be outer space.”26 The boundary
line used for this theory “is approximately 96 to 110 kilometers above the
[e]arth’s surface, which is the lowest altitude at which a satellite can
currently maintain orbit.”27
However, while the precise legal contours of what constitutes outer
space is relevant for treaties governing activities in outer space, it is of
less concern here than are the resources that are on celestial bodies in
outer space and the claims that nations and private entities make to
20. See discussion infra Part V.
21. Vice President Mike Pence, Remarks at the 34th Space Symposium (Apr. 16, 2018),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-vice-president-pence-34th-spacesymposium-colorado-springs-co/.
22. See Davin Widgerow, Comment, Boldly Going Where No Realtor Has Gone Before:
The Law of Outer Space and a Proposal for a New Interplanetary Property Law System, 28
WIS. INT’L L.J. 490, 493 (2011) (“[T]he natural human tendency to explore uncharted frontiers
demands a human return to space.”).
23. See id. at 492–93.
24. Reinstein, supra note 1, at 95.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
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them.28 Some of these resources are very valuable and, if they exist on
Earth, are extremely rare.29 It is the economic benefit of these resources
that fuels the current space race among the numerous nations and private
enterprises.30 The history of this current space race and space exploration
in general, commonly referred to as the “Space Age,” can be traced back
to the mid-1950s.31
The Space Age began in 1957 with the Soviet launch of the first
satellite (“Sputnik I”) into space, followed shortly by the United States’
launch of Explorer I.32 Fifty years after Sputnik I, over 115 countries
owned or shared ownership of an orbiting satellite.33 Since then, countries
and private companies have made 5,000 launches.34 As of 2011, there
were over 950 operational satellites circling the earth.35
By 2005, China, which established its space program a scant thirteen
years earlier in 1992, employed “tens of thousands of scientific,
manufacturing and planning personnel in more than 3,000 factories.”36
The Chinese beat their goal of launching a manned flight to outer space
in 2005 by nearly two years.37 Five countries intend to go to the moon by
2020, and the United States expects to establish a permanently staffed
station by 2024.38 In fact,
28. See Stephen DiMaria, Note, Starships and Enterprise: Private Spaceflight Companies’ Property Rights and the U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, 90 ST.
JOHN’S L. REV., 415, 419 (2016). Resources in outer space are either res communis, “to be
enjoyed and shared by all people in common,” or res nullius, not subject to being owned, “but
attainable by the first person to occupy of capture the property.” Id. “In line with the international obligations guiding [the U.S. Space Launch Competitiveness Act], outer space is no
longer purely res nullius, because the Outer Space Treaty has imposed some environmental
restrictions and a requirement of international cooperation.” Id. at 433.
29. Sarah Coffey, Note, Establishing a Legal Framework for Property Rights to Natural
Resources in Outer Space, 41 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 119, 120 (2009) (“The moon, Mars,
and other celestial bodies contain resources that are scarce or non-existent on Earth and which
could have immense value. One example is helium-3, a substance common on the moon but
exceedingly scarce on Earth. Helium-3 has better potential for providing clean, efficient energy than any other source currently known on Earth.”).
30. Widgerow, supra note 22, at 492–93.
31. See Jared B. Taylor, Note, Tragedy of the Space Commons: A Market Mechanism
Solution to the Space Debris Problem, 50 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 253, 258 (2011).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Emily M. Nevala, Comment, Waste in Space: Remediating Space Debris Through the
Doctrine of Abandonment and the Law of Capture, 66 AM. U.L. REV. 1495, 1497 (2017).
35. Taylor, supra note 31, at 256.
36. April Greene Apking, Note, The Rush to Develop Space: The Role of Spacefaring
Nations in Forging Environmental Standards for the Use of Celestial Bodies for Governmental and Private Interests, 16 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 429, 434–35 (2005).
37. Id. at 435.
38. Coffey, supra note 29, at 120; see also id. at 123 (“[A]t least six nations and numerous
private companies have plans to go to the moon in the near future. NASA’s Vision for Space
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[a] recent [National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)]funded study estimated that the United States, in partnership with
private industry, could return humans to the moon in as little as five to
seven years for about $10 billion. That same study also contemplated
the possibilities of an estimated $40 billion lunar base, which would
dramatically cut costs in future missions to Mars.39

“In March 2004, the European Space Agency successfully launched
the Rosetta Spacecraft from Kourou, French Guiana. Over $1.5 billion,
ten years, and four billion miles later, the [spacecraft] released a
sophisticated 220-pound probe called the ‘Philae,’ which landed on
Comet 67P/Churyumov-Gerasimenko on November 12, 2014,” the first
time any country or company has achieved this.40 “During its year-long
stay on Comet 67P, the Philae probe has drilled into the surface to collect
samples, taken a series of photographs, and conducted a swath of
experiments, . . . provid[ing] never-before-seen data that has the potential
to shed light on the origins of the universe.”41
Once the European Union demonstrated the ability to land on a
comet, the idea of landing on a resource rich asteroid came closer to
reality.42 Asteroids, the “similarly situated cousins” of comets, “present
potentially extraordinary incentives for mining and exploitation.”43 The
low gravity of asteroids decreases the amount of fuel required to land and
take off from the asteroid’s surface, reducing the cost of asteroid mining
to a more “palatable” level.44 Additionally, “[w]ater, extracted from
hydrated clay minerals present on asteroids, can be harvested and turned
into hydrogen rocket fuel, giving asteroids the potential to be deep space

Exploration aims to send astronauts back to the moon in 2020 and to establish a permanently
staffed base by 2024.”); Apking, supra note 36, at 437 (“Japan, Brazil, France, and the European Union . . . represent examples of countries only recently venturing into space.”). But see
Brehm, supra note 1, at 371 (“As of 2013, only eleven nations had functioning space programs. There are even fewer countries where private space exploration entities exist.”).
39. DiMaria, supra note 28, at 415.
40. Elliot Reaven, Note, The United States Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness
Act: The Creation of Private Space Property Rights and the Omission of the Right to Freedom
from Harmful Interference, 94 WASH. U.L. REV. 233, 233 (2016).
41. Id.
42. See Kevin MacWhorter, Sustainable Mining: Incentivizing Asteroid Mining in the
Name of Environmentalism, 40 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 645, 652 (2016) (“With
the European Space Agency successfully landing the Philae Lander on Comet 67P, it is much
more plausible to land a mining operation on an asteroid.”); Reaven, supra note 40, at 234
(“[P]roof of our ability to land on a comet makes the idea of landing on and potentially excavating an asteroid more realistic.”).
43. See Reaven, supra note 40, at 234.
44. Id.
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gas stations.”45
Not just countries are launching spacecraft into outer space; space
flights by private ventures are thriving.46 Companies like Planetary
Resources, Inc., and Deep Space Industries (DSI) have initiated programs
and actual launching tests for prospecting profitable resources on
asteroids.47 A study by the Keck Institute for Space Studies estimates that
bringing an asteroid back to Earth’s orbit would cost only $2.6 billion,
which would be offset by the economic benefits of “harvesting precious
metals, helium-3, and even water.”48
Private investment in space, not foreseen when the international
framework regulating activities in space was put into place, has grown,
while government investment in space has “shrunk.”49 Although the
expenditures of NASA have increased since 1958, its overall budget “as
a percentage of U.S. spending has decreased dramatically.”50 NASA, in
the aftermath of retiring its shuttle fleet in 2011, has relied increasingly
on private contractors to design and build spacecrafts. 51 In response to
these federal cutbacks, the private space industry has grown
dramatically.52
Illustrating that trend, between 1996 and 2001, experts predicted that
“private-sector investment in telecommunications satellites alone” would
equal $54.3 billion (including launch)—an amount that does not include
other commercial space ventures or investment in Russian and Chinese

45. Id. at 235. “Since asteroids can serve as a water source throughout the galaxy, incentivizing commercial asteroid development serves the additional purpose of increasing the capacity for human space flight.” Id. at 252.
46. Brehm, supra note 1, at 378 (“The dawning of the new millennium has coincided with
the creation of a new vehicle for understanding outer space—private space exploration.”).
47. DiMaria, supra note 28, at 415.
48. Id. at 415–16.
49. See Reinstein, supra note 1, at 98 (stating that an indication of this shrink is that commercial space activities currently “generate more revenues than government contracts”);
Widgerow, supra note 22, at 499 (“The apparent reason for this explosion in space investment
is that private space ventures promise great profits should they be realized . . . .”).
50. MacWhorter, supra note 42, at 650. Contradicting this trend, in 2014, NASA requested a budget that included “$105 million to begin work on a mission that would send a
robotic spacecraft to capture an asteroid as early as 2019 and haul it back so that astronauts
could rendezvous with it by 2022.” Id. at 653. In 2017, NASA closed out its mission to collect
a large boulder from an asteroid and bring it back to Earth. Jeff Foust, NASA Closing Out
Asteroid Redirect Mission, SPACE NEWS (June 14, 1017), http://spacenews.com/nasa-closingout-asteroid-redirect-mission.
51. MacWhorter, supra note 42, at 650 (“That year, NASA awarded four private space
companies—SpaceX, Blue Origin LLC, Boeing Co., and Sierra Nevada Corp.—contracts
worth a combined total of $269.3 million to transport cargo and crew to and from the International Space Station. More companies, such as Orbital Sciences, have followed suit.”).
52. Id.
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satellites.53 An additional “$70 billion was projected to be invested in
satellite communications ground stations over the same period.”54
Research is discovering “phenomena unique to the low- and no-gravity
environment of space” with the possibility of “space-based processing of
new alloys.”55 “Engineers have considered the possibility of capturing
solar energy in massive quantities by laying out giant cells in space and
on our moon.”56
Private space flights are on the cusp of becoming a reality. In
October 2012, a private company, SpaceX, launched “the first official
commercial flight to the International Space Station [(ISS)].” 57 Since its
first launch, SpaceX has sent sixteen missions to the ISS58 and has
successfully launched a reusable rocket.59 Another company, Planetary
Resources, has invested millions of dollars in “plans to mine asteroids for
their mineral resources in the near future,” while other companies are
focusing on their efforts in extracting valuable materials from the moon.60
The founders of Google have made large investments in private space
flight.61 Google offered $30 million in prizes to any team who, before
2016, could (1) land a robot on the moon’s surface, (2) have it travel 1,640
feet over the moon’s surface, and then (3) transmit video images and data
back to Earth,62 but as of March 2018, no one had won the prize and the
competition was over.63
It is indisputable that “reservoirs of great wealth sit untapped in
space.”64 However, only recently has technology advanced to a point
53. Reinstein, supra note 1, at 59.
54. Id.
55. Id. “The field of biotechnology is also taking advantage of zero-gravity conditions to
manufacture protein crystals, which the pharmaceutical industry can use to create drugs that
are able to ‘turn off’ a protein, thereby regulating metabolic processes.” Id. at 59–60.
56. Id. at 60.
57. Brian Abrams, First Contact: Establishing Jurisdiction Over Activities in Outer
Space, 42 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 797, 799 (2014).
58. Missions, SPACEX, https://www.spacex.com/missions (last visited Mar. 6, 2019).
59. About SpaceX, SPACEX, https://www.spacex.com/missions (last visited Mar. 6, 2019)
(“SpaceX successfully achieved the historic first reflight of an orbital class rocket in 2017,
and the company now regularly launches flight-proven rockets. In 2018, SpaceX began
launching Falcon Heavy, the world’s most powerful operational rocket by a factor of two.”).
Currently, SpaceX is working to create the “next generation of fully reusable launch vehicles
that will be the most powerful ever built, capable of carrying humans to Mars and other destinations in the solar system.” Id.
60. Abrams, supra note 57.
61. MacWhorter, supra note 42, at 650.
62. Id.
63. Loren Grush, It’s Official: No One Is Going to Win the Google Lunar X Prize Competition, VERGE (Jan. 23, 2018, 3:14 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2018/3/31/17176530/
google-lunar-x-prize-competition-spaceil-moon-express-astrobotic.
64. Reinstein, supra note 1, at 72.
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where resources can be extracted from asteroids.65 The most
economically promising development activity in outer space is mining
celestial bodies like the moon and asteroids.66 Asteroids’ “zero gravity
fields and availability of metals” have made them serious “candidates for
resource extraction since the beginning of the [S]pace [A]ge.” 67 “The
estimated [h]elium-3 reserves on our moon would create, in a controlled
fusion reaction, [ten] times as much energy as is contained in Earth’s
recoverable coal, oil, and gas combined.”68 Evidence is growing that
some near-Earth asteroids “contain gold, rhenium, germanium, and
platinum-group metals—platinum, palladium, iridium, osmium,
rhodium, and ruthenium—at concentrations of up to 100 times those that
are mined on Earth.”69 Metals like iron, gold, and platinum are important
to many current technologies.70 “Astrophysicists estimate that each
[asteroid] could contain 30 million tons of nickel, 1.5 million tons of
cobalt, and 7,500 tons of platinum, among other minerals. To put that in
economic terms, the value of each asteroid could be ‘somewhere in the
trillions [of dollars] or higher.’”71
The attractiveness of these resources is increased by the fact that
“certain elements crucial to modern industry—such as platinum, zinc,
copper, phosphorous, lead, gold, and indium—could be exhausted on
Earth. Many of these have no synthetic alternative, unlike chemical
elements.”72
[T]he energy required to extract minerals from an asteroid is
considerably less than to extract from the [e]arth, or even the moon . . .,
because in space there is no atmosphere to oxidise [sic] or salt to
corrode, no weather, no gravity or friction to oppose transportation,
dissipate energy and waste heat and unlimited heat from the sun and
coldness in space for refrigeration, creating the “perfect vacuum” . . . .73

These materials could augment Earth’s diminishing supply of these
65. MacWhorter, supra note 42, at 652.
66. Reinstein, supra note 1, at 60.
67. MacWhorter, supra note 42, at 652.
68. Reinstein, supra note 1, at 61 (emphasis added).
69. Id. at 60. “Glenn Reynolds has observed, ‘The smallest known near-[E]arth metal
asteroid contains more metal than has been mined by humanity since the beginning of time.’
It has been estimated that 2,000 NEAs larger than 1 km in diameter exist.” Id.
70. MacWhorter, supra note 42, at 652.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 647. “[D]espite their high costs, platinum group metals are so useful that [one]
of [four] industrial goods on Earth require them in production.” Id. at 648.
73. Nilima Choudhury, Asteroid Minerals Mining to be Achieved Within Five Years,
INDUS. MIN. (Mar. 14, 2014), http://www.indmin.com/Article/3319663/Asteroid-mineralsmining-to-beachieved-within-five-years.html (summarizing the remarks of Chris Lewicki,
President of Planetary Resources).
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resources.74 For example, the moon may contain a sufficient amount of
helium-3 to meet “the world’s energy needs through fusion reactors,”75
giving it one of the best “potential[s] for providing clean, efficient energy
[of all the] other possible source[s] currently known on Earth.”76 The
development of helium-3 and other resources on the moon, like water,
“could provide the raw materials for a manned outpost’s fuel,
construction materials, and life support systems” in outer space.77
Asteroids are also “rich in ruthenium, rhodium, osmium, iridium, and
platinum,” which are not found in any significant quantities on Earth.78
These materials are important for the development of electronics.79
Development of these materials could lower the cost of electronics.80 An
additional inducement to developing outer space resources is that the
terrestrial extraction of these materials can cause significant
environmental damage.81 The fact that exploiting the mineral resources
found on asteroids would avoid completely, or reduce significantly, the
harmful environmental and sociological effects of terrestrial mining82 and
would be enabled by investment dollars warrants “serious inquiry” into
the activity’s future.83
74. Apking, supra note 36, at 432. Apking also notes that the availability of these resources makes outer space livable, which might help counter Earth’s “swelling population.”
Id.
75. David Johnson, Comment, Limits on the Giant Leap for Mankind: Legal Ambiguities
of Extraterrestrial Resource Extraction, 26 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1477, 1480 (2011) (“The
moon alone is believed to contain enough [h]elium-3 to supply the world’s energy needs
through fusion reactors.”).
76. Coffey, supra note 29, at 121–22.
77. Johnson, supra note 75, at 1480–81. “Thus, the fate of space exploration and enterprise may depend on whether astronauts can make use of the celestial environment, rather
than rely on terrestrial resources.” Id. at 1481.
78. Brehm, supra note 1; see also Reinstein, supra note 1, at 60 (“Many of these [nearEarth asteroids] seem to be rich in raw materials that are either rare and valuable on Earth, or
common on Earth, needed in space, but expensive to launch.”).
79. Brehm, supra note 1 (“These elements are extremely rare on Earth and are important
materials in developing electronics. . . . [E]ach of these platinum group elements draws a high
market price, creating incentives to explore space for entrepreneurs and investors alike.”).
80. Id. at 355.
81. See Reinstein, supra note 1, at 65.
82. MacWhorter, supra note 42, at 647–48.
[B]y extracting tiny amounts of metals from relatively large quantities of ore, the mining industry contributes the largest portion of solid wastes in the world. The Environmental Protection Agency . . . describes the industry as the source of “more toxic and
hazardous waste than any other industrial sector [in the United States], costing billions
of dollars to address the public health and environmental threats to communities.”
Id. at 648.
83. Id. at 646–47. “The economic benefits of mining need not be sacrificed for the sake
of the environment.” Id. at 649.

BABCOCK FINAL ARTICLE

202

6/20/2019 1:28 PM

Syracuse Law Review

[Vol. 69:191

Colonization of outer space might also help with terrestrial overpopulation.84 The moon has potential for use as a base that might allow
for testing of equipment and development of necessary skills for a
manned mission to Mars.85 By providing the platform for “a deep space
observatory,” the moon might “replace the Hubble space telescope and
allow for better quality pictures” because the orbit of the Hubble
telescope is only 250 miles from Earth, while the [m]oon’s orbit is
240,000 miles.86
An indication of how seriously private companies view the
possibility of mining asteroids is several billionaire investors—including
two Google executives, a Hollywood director, and Ross Perot, Jr.— who
in 2012 announced that they were investing heavily in a company called
Planetary Resources, which is developing the technology to mine a nearEarth asteroid and bring those materials back to Earth.87 The company
hopes to do this by creating small spacecrafts that can “hitch a ride into
space with larger, primary payloads.”88 Another company, DSI, which
was created for the purpose of extracting and harvesting materials from
asteroids,
is developing a four-stage system for mining in space: Prospecting,
Processing, Harvesting, and Manufacturing. It has already invented one
spacecraft to be used for the Prospecting stage: a tiny probe, called
FireFly, designed to scout asteroids and study their “size, shape, spin
and composition . . . .” For the Processing phase, DSI is creating
technology required to “transform regolith to raw materials” for
manufacture. The company is currently developing another spacecraft,
called a Harvestor, for the third stage to collect and transport resources.
Finally, the company is creating technology to manufacture finished
products in space.89

Planetary Resources also “hopes to mine hydrogen fuels” from
asteroids, which could then be used to power expeditions deeper into
space.90 DSI has “an end goal of using the materials to support outer space

84. See id. at 60 (“Colonization—pushing humanity’s living room beyond its ‘surly
bonds’—might, depending on how it [is] implemented, represent a complete answer to the
potential disaster of overpopulation and its effects.”).
85. Apking, supra note 36, at 440. But see Reinstein, supra note 1, at 63 (noting that while
the moon may be a very “promising [site] for mining, energy-capture projects, and spaceship
refueling,” it has a limited amount of usable water).
86. Apking, supra note 36, at 440 (saying the moon could take the place of the behindschedule and over-budget the ISS, which is of limited use anyway).
87. Brehm, supra note 1; MacWhorter, supra note 42, at 650–51.
88. MacWhorter, supra note 42, at 653.
89. Id. at 653 (internal footnotes omitted); see also Brehm, supra note 1.
90. Brehm, supra note 1.
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communities and fuel further exploration.”91 “In 2011, Microsoft
billionaire Naveen Jain announced the creation of Moon Express, a
private space exploration entity that plans to mine for platinum and
titanium on the [m]oon.”92 And in that same year, a “venture start-up
Shackleton Energy Company launched fund-raising efforts, ultimately
seeking to mine the Shackleton Crater in the [m]oon’s south pole for fuels
to propel deeper space expeditions.”93
Space tourism by private companies is “on the rise.”94 Experts
estimate that space tourism will be worth $1 billion by 2023. 95 Private
companies are developing the capacity to take passengers on a “quick
jaunt into outer space.”96 These ventures will
include space hotels (profits estimated at $5 billion a year by 2015),
contracting with NASA to send humans to Mars (profits at $400 billion
by 2030), orbital labs for the development of microchips and biotech
devices (profits at $10 billion by 2015), solar satellites and electricity
($100 billion by 2020), a space elevator that aims to replace rockets ($2
billion by 2021), asteroid mineral mining ($10 billion by 2030), [and]
lunar mining ($354 billion by 2050). . . . Clearly, private industry has
economic incentives motivating it to invest in space exploration and
technologies.97

The sale of land on asteroids and the moon is also proceeding apace.
Some believe that “[p]eople will line up to pay money for recognized
titles to acres of speculative Lunar real estate just because they are part
of mankind’s first permanent space settlement, which offers regular
transportation back and forth, so the land could someday be developed,
and theoretically, they could visit someday.” 98 Denis Hope, founder of
Lunar Embassy,
sold 3,500 “properties” in the first sixteen years of the [company’s
existence], and since 1998 he has managed a two-tier “reselling”
program, whereby current owners of Hope’s lunar property could, in
turn, sell their properties to other buyers. In December 2005, there were
91. Id. at 354–55.
92. Id. at 355.
93. Id.
94. MacWhorter, supra note 42, at 650; see also Apking, supra note 36, at 444 (describing various initiatives by private companies to develop tourist trade, including sending capsules containing personal property of customers like business cards, jewelry, and even cremated remains, to the moon).
95. Widgerow, supra note 22, at 499.
96. Abrams, supra note 57, at 799–800.
97. Widgerow, supra note 22, at 499 (internal footnote omitted).
98. Alan Wasser & Douglas Jobes, Space Settlements, Property Rights, and International
Law: Could a Lunar Settlement Claim the Lunar Real Estate It Needs to Survive?, 73 J. AIR
L. & COM. 37, 75 (2008).
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twenty-seven reselling agents in the United States, and his
“Ambassadorship” program has representatives in fifteen countries.
While the international community has thus far ignored Hope, the
proliferation of copycat companies selling lunar realty symbolizes the
persistent enthusiasm that space ownership holds for thousands of
people.99

All this activity in space has not been without environmental cost.
For example, one residue of the presence of humans and their equipment
in outer space has been space debris, which can cause damage to
functional satellites.100 Even microparticulate debris like paint chips can
cause damage to the surface of satellites and spacecraft, an example of
which was the need to replace part of the Space Shuttle Challenger’s
windshield as a result of a crack caused by a single paint chip.101 In 2009,
the first time two intact satellites crashed into each other, a non-functional
Russian satellite crashed into a functioning American communications
satellite, releasing “upwards of 2,000 pieces of orbital debris.”102 Two
years earlier, China destroyed a weather satellite as part of an antisatellite missile test that produced “2,500 pieces of orbital debris.”103

99. Widgerow, supra note 22, at 501–02 (internal footnotes omitted).
This issue was brought under consideration when Greg Nemitz brought suit against
NASA seeking declaratory judgment concerning alleged property rights in the asteroid Eros. Nemitz officially published a claim of ownership to Asteroid 433, Eros.
Eleven months later, NASA’s NEAR Shoemaker spacecraft landed on Eros. Nemitz
sent NASA a twenty-dollar invoice for parking and storage fees. NASA refused to
pay and Nemitz brought suit. Nemitz’s action was dismissed, however, for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The court found that Nemitz had failed
to establish a legally recognizable property interest in Eros.
Brehm, supra note 1, at 359–60.
100. Nevala, supra note 34, at 1498; see also Hugh Lewis, Trouble in Orbit: The Growing
Problem of Space Junk, BBC NEWS (Aug. 5, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-33782943 (“In 2014, the [ISS] had to move three times to avoid lethal chunks of
space debris.”); Jillian Scudder, How Do We Clean Up All that Space Debris?, FORBES (Jan.
6, 2016, 7:18 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jillianscudder/2016/01/06/astroquizzicalspace-debris/#1583bce31a3b (noting that even paint-flake debris can cause serious damage
to spacecraft).
101. See Taylor, supra note 31, at 262 (“Though small, microparticulate debris can still
damage the outer surfaces of satellites and spacecraft. For example, a portion of the Space
Shuttle Challenger’s windshield was cracked by a paint chip only two-tenths of a millimeter
in size, necessitating its replacement after the mission’s conclusion.”). In fact, “[m]ost debris
orbits with enough momentum to damage or destroy anything in its path.” Id. at 255.
102. Nevala, supra note 34, at 1498.
103. Id. at 1497–98. “Experts consider[ed] this [to be] ‘the most prolific and serious fragmentation’ in space exploration history.” Id. There are “[a]pproximately 15,000 catalogued
pieces of space debris currently orbit[ing] the [e]arth, and this amount increases every year.”
Taylor, supra note 31, at 255.
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Experts think that 194 satellites have come apart in orbit.104
Space debris can remain in orbit up to thousands of years 105 and, if
not controlled or removed, could “render space useless.”106 Because
international treaties governing space “encourage[] and facilitate[] the
use of space at the expense of environmental regulation,” they have little
to offer in the way of managing the debris problem.107 By assuring that
orbital space can be accessed and polluted by anyone “as a common
property resource,”108 “no country fully internalizes the costs of the space
debris it creates and thus no country has a strong incentive to limit or
reduce its space debris.”109 The lack of physical boundaries also makes it
difficult to assign property rights in and responsibilities for the removal
or control of these materials.110
Additionally, the projected presence of humans in outer space could
be a source of contamination of the surface of any celestial body they
encounter.111 Examples of this “include fuel spills from mining
operations, abandoned structures cluttering the moonscape, problems of
disposal of human waste in large quantities, and depletion of various
natural resources.”112 Although unlikely, given the fact that “only wellestablished companies with the capital and resources to invest in asteroid
mining will be able to mine asteroids,”113 there is also the possibility that
all these private ventures, particularly mining, will create something akin
to the lawless California Gold Rush in outer space.114

104. Taylor, supra note 31, at 261.
105. Id. at 257.
106. Id. at 255; see also Reinstein, supra note 1, at 65 (“Orbiting litter may soon seriously
hinder our ability to maintain a global communications link.”).
107. Taylor, supra note 31, at 255.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 260.
110. Id. at 258 (“[S]imilar to the ocean and its tides, the physical characteristics of [Low
Earth Orbit] make the establishment of traditional, spatially demarcated property rights impractical.”).
111. Apking, supra note 36, at 445.
112. Id.; see also Reinstein, supra note 1, at 65 (“The importance of an environmentalist
ethos in this context derives, in part, from the concerns we already deal with on Earth: the
preservation of the natural environment for its own sake and for our communal survival, as
well as the conservation of natural resources.”). But see MacWhorter, supra note 42, at 676
(“While astroenvironmentalism is a laudable goal in some areas of commercial space ventures, it does not apply to the exploitation of asteroids. Asteroids are uninhabitable. They have
zero gravity, no atmosphere, and are found in ‘the “perfect vacuum.”‘ Exploiting asteroids
‘damages no ecospheres since they are lifeless rocks left over from the formation of the solar
system.’”).
113. MacWhorter, supra note 42, at 669.
114. Id. at 674–75 (“First of all, the sheer number of asteroids—and the quantity of minerals contained within—limits potential disputes over claims of property. Most problems dur-
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Many of these ventures and the potential to do harm may become
not only technologically feasible, but also economically feasible in the
not too distant future.115 “The price of launch has decreased due to
improved technology and increased competition.”116 The principal reason
that space is not being developed “is the uncertainty of the legal
regime.”117 Part II examines that regime and its impact on activities in
outer space, like mining.
II. LEGAL FRAMEWORK—THE RULES OF THE ROAD
“The utility of space, however, is limited to the extent that it can be
accessed and used.”118

There are two principal international treaties that apply to activities
in outer space—the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities
of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon
and Other Celestial Bodies (the “Outer Space Treaty” or “OST”) 119 and
the 1979 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and
Other Celestial Bodies (the “Moon Treaty”).120 There are other treaties of
less significance for purposes of this Article, like treaties that govern
liability for accidents in space121 and the rescue of astronauts.122 One
hundred and two countries have adopted the OST, including the United

ing the California Gold Rush arose because both real estate and minerals were limited. Second, the expense of sending mining ventures to an asteroid is so prohibitive that only those
companies that have the requisite funding will be able to enter the market. Finally, the amount
of material any one project can ferry from an asteroid and back will necessarily be limited
due to the size of spacecraft.”); see also Reinstein, supra note 1, at 61 (“Recent price estimates
of launching material into orbit costs approximately $10,000 per pound; $25,000–30,000 per
pound of material to launch to our moon. The tremendous cost of launch, retrieval, and return
means that ‘if there was gold in low Earth orbit and all the shuttle had to do was go up and
open its cargo bay doors and let [the gold] fall in, it would[ not] be worth it, even then.’”).
115. Reinstein, supra note 1, at 60–61.
116. Id. at 61; see MacWhorter, supra note 42, at 651 (“One of the most significant obstacles for the private space industry has been the price tag of traveling into space.”).
117. Reinstein, supra note 1, at 61; see MacWhorter, supra note 42, at 651 (“Complicating
matters, the current law governing claims of property in space is ambiguous.”).
118. Taylor, supra note 31, at 254.
119. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, opened for signature Jan. 27,
1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty].
120. Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, opened for signature Dec. 18, 1979, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Moon Treaty].
121. See Convention on the International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects,
opened for signature Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter Space
Liability Treaty].
122. See Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return
of Objects Launched into Outer Space, opened for signature Apr. 22, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 7570,
672 U.N.T.S. 119 [hereinafter Rescue Treaty].
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States and the former Soviet Union; its broad acceptance “has given it the
character of binding international law even on those countries who have
not ratified it.”123 In contrast, only thirteen countries have adopted the
Moon Treaty and, therefore, it is in effect only with respect to those
countries.124 Neither treaty establishes a governance regime for outer
space, and neither treaty resolves any of the property ownership
questions, which motivated the writing of this Article.125 For example,
while the OST clearly bars the appropriation of “celestial bodies” by
countries, it does not address private entities appropriating them.126
The origins of the OST are in General Assembly Resolution 1348
(XIII) of December 13, 1958, one purpose of which was “to avoid the
extension of present national rivalries into this new field.”127 Its roots are
in the aftermath of the Cold War and a concomitant desire to avoid
turning outer space into a war zone.128 “Concerns over space imperialism
were the main impetus for the central provision of the OST: the principle
of nonappropriation of space by Nation-States.”129 The non-militarist
purpose of the Outer Space Treaty was very important to the United
States.130 “Each side of the Cold War was hoping to prevent the other
from advancing as a sovereign into outer space and achieving an
insurmountable military and geographic superiority. As a result, the OST
123. Reinstein, supra note 1, at 66.
124. Coffey, supra note 29, at 127.
125. See Wasser & Jobes, supra note 98, at 58–59.
126. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 119, art. II; see also MacWhorter, supra note 42, at
660.
127. G.A. Res. 1348 (XIII), at 5 (Dec. 13, 1958).
128. Brehm, supra note 1, at 357 (internal footnote omitted) (“Subsequent international
negotiations concerning outer space, all taking place under the shadow of Cold War political
and militaristic tensions, led to the drafting of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. The Outer Space Treaty, commonly referred to as the second ‘non-armament’
treaty, was signed on January 27, 1967.”); Id. at 371–72 (“The seminal treaty in this arena,
the Outer Space Treaty, stems from the non-armament context of the Cold War and the global
impact of potential militarization of outer space.”).
129. Elliott Reavan, Comment, The United States Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act: The Creation of Private Space Property Rights and the Omission of the Right to
Freedom from Harmful Interference, 94 WASH. U.L. REV. 238, 243 (2016).
130. See U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., 1st Comm. at 8–10, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV.1492 (Dec. 17,
1966), http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/garecords/A_C1_PV1492E.pdf. (statement of U.S. Representative, Arthur J. Goldberg, to the General Assembly) (“We of the United States regard this
treaty as an important step toward peace. . . . Therefore, as we stand on the threshold of the
[S]pace [A]ge, our first responsibility as governments is clear: we must make sure that man’s
earthly conflicts will not be carried into outer space. . . . [The Outer Space Treaty] responds
to that desire and hope.”); see also STAFF OF COMM. ON AERONAUTICAL AND SPACE SCI., 90TH
CONG., TREATY ON PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE ACTIVITIES OF STATES IN THE EXPLORATION
AND USE OF OUTER SPACE, INCLUDING THE MOON AND OTHER CELESTIAL BODIES 15 (Comm.
Print 1967); Reinstein, supra note 1, at 62; Wasser & Jobes, supra note 98, at 42.
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is at best ambiguous, and at worst hostile, to the privatization and
commercialization of space resources.”131
The Outer Space Treaty establishes the basic framework governing
activities in outer space.132 It broadly
declares that outer space is free for exploration and use by all states, that
the moon and other celestial bodies shall be used exclusively for
peaceful purposes, that outer space is not subject to national
appropriation by claim of sovereignty, and that the exploration and use
of outer space shall be carried of [sic] for the benefit and interest of all
countries and shall be the province of all mankind.133

By making it impossible for any country to control outer space, the treaty
“addressed Cold War concerns about [countries] claiming space and
celestial bodies as their own territory and using them to station weapons
for use against other countries.”134 While the OST encourages “[t]he
exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial
bodies,”135 it fails to confront today’s concerns about claiming resources
from these entities.136 Its general principles, which were to be expanded
upon in subsequent treaties, do not contain much guidance on the
ownership of extraterrestrial property or resources.137 The drafters of the
treaty “did not set out to create a comprehensive legal document to govern
space for all eternity.”138 Thus, the OST is no more than “a diplomatic
stopgap hurriedly prepared before the first landing on the moon could
ignite a new theater of Cold War conflict.”139 The drafters clearly “did
131. Reinstein, supra note 1, at 63.
132. Coffey, supra note 29, at 125.
133. Id. (citing Outer Space Treaty, supra note 119, arts. I–II).
134. Id.
135. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 119, art. I.
136. Coffey, supra note 29, at 125; see also Reavan, supra note 129, at 244 (“Taken together, it is clear that the OST precludes any claim over territorial rights in space of any kind.
What is less clear, however, is whether the appropriation of space resources is consistent with
the OST, as the OST does not explicitly mention the extraction or ownership of space resources.”). Coffey goes further, saying that “mining or owning natural resources is not one of
the forbidden activities.” Coffey, supra 29, at 126. MacWhorter believes that while the United
States could not extend its jurisdiction over the surface of a celestial body because this action
would be barred by the OST, “[i]t could, however, unilaterally guarantee property rights in
extracted minerals within its own borders.” MacWhorter, supra note 42, at 665.
137. MacWhorter, supra note 42, at 660–61. Arthur Goldberg, then head of the U.S. negotiating team on the Outer Space Treaty, in response to a question at the Senate ratification
hearings about Article I, said that “the article [was] a ‘broad general declaration of purposes’
that would have no specific impact until its intent was detailed in subsequent, detailed agreements.” John W. Finney, Space Treaty Called ‘Fuzzy’ at Senate Hearings: Rusk and Goldberg
Dispute Unexpected Objections by Gore and Fulbright, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1967, at 20; see
also Wasser & Jobes, supra note 98, at 42.
138. Johnson, supra note 75, at 1508.
139. Id. Johnson goes on to say that given the context in which the Treaty was drafted, its
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not contemplate the rise of private space flight” 140 and the ensuing push
by private companies to engage in commercial activities in outer space.141
Article I of the Outer Space Treaty establishes a principle of free use
and open access by declaring that outer space and celestial bodies “shall
be the province of all mankind”—specifically, that “exploration and use
of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be
carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries . . . and shall
be the province of all mankind.”142 Article I “establishes the OST’s
fundamental presumption that outer space is ‘free for exploration and
use.’”143 The generally accepted interpretation of this language is an
“affirmation of general principles of access” that “confirms the freedom
of use because every state has an equal right to pursue space activities . . .
rather than a prohibition of certain activities.”144 Therefore, a claim by
any nation of exclusive jurisdiction over a part of outer space could
infringe on the rights of other states to access that area.145 Article I
“[e]ssentially . . . establishes a presumptive freedom of use, while the
succeeding provisions qualify that freedom in a manner which advances
the treaty’s peaceful purpose.”146
Article II is one of those succeeding provisions that curtails “the
freedom of use outlined in Article [I] by declaring that outer space,
including the [m]oon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national
appropriation.”147 It flatly prohibits national appropriation of any celestial
body in outer space “by means of use or occupation, or by any other
means.”148 However, “many types of ‘use’ or ‘exploitation’. . . are
inconceivable without appropriation of some degree at least of any
materials taken,” like ore or water.149 If this view of Article II’s
prohibitory language is correct, then “it is not at all farfetched to say that

authors “could not have intended a rule against private extraction of lunar minerals since Cold
War-era technology was insufficiently developed to allow for such activities.” Id. He finds
support for that conclusion in the number of Senate floor speeches regarding the Treaty’s
ratification which made no mention of space mining. Id. at 1509.
140. MacWhorter, supra note 42, at 660.
141. Id. at 649.
142. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 119, art. I.
143. Johnson, supra note 75, at 1500 (quoting Outer Space Treaty, supra note 119, art. I).
144. Johnson, supra note 75, at 1501.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1486. “Ultimately, the drafters decided on the less intrusive principle, setting
the tone for the rest of the treaty by establishing that the freedom to use space is a positive
right that can only be defeated by a corresponding restriction found later in the treaty.” Id. at
1504.
147. Id. at 1486 (citing Outer Space Treaty, supra note 119, art. II).
148. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 119, art. II.
149. Reinstein, supra note 1, at 69.
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the OST actually installs a blanket prohibition on many beneficial forms
of development.”150 However, the OST only prohibits an appropriation
that constitutes a “long-term use and permanent occupation, to the
exclusion of all others.”151
Article VI of the OST “opens the door” for private exploration of
outer space and celestial bodies152 by declaring that “States Parties to the
Treaty shall bear international responsibility for national activities in
outer space, including the [m]oon and other celestial bodies, whether such
activities are carried on by governmental agencies or by nongovernmental entities . . . .”153 Article VIII “confers jurisdictional control
over the space objects and people engaged in outer space expeditions to
the state party of the treaty on whose registry the object or person
appears,” while Article IX enjoins parties engaged in activities in outer
space to act with “due regard” to the interests of other countries in outer
space and to not contaminate celestial bodies.154 Article X requires parties
to the treaty to make space launches available for observation by other
parties.155 “Articles XI and XII impose disclosure requirements,
mandating that spacefarers must keep the public informed of their
activities, and allow for other parties to visit outer space installations after
appropriate notice.”156
Ezra Reinstein calls the Outer Space Treaty’s view on property law
“oddly conflicted.”157 “On the one hand, the OST seems to endorse some
property rights in [outer] space” by paying at least “lip service to the
‘exploration and use’ of outer space” in the Preamble and Article I,158
while on the other, seems to deny these rights by declaring that these
activities “shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all
countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific
development, and shall be the province of all mankind.”159 He notes that
there is “widespread disagreement regarding the force” of the phrase
“province of all mankind.”160 Some hold that the language is only “a nonbinding guide, a moral exhortation.”161 Others see the language, together
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
XII).
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Id.
Id. at 70.
Brehm, supra note 1, at 358.
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 119, art. VI.
Id. arts. VIII–IX.
Id. art. X.
DiMaria, supra note 28, at 420 (citing Outer Space Treaty, supra note 119, arts. XI–
Reinstein, supra note 1, at 66.
Id.
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 119, art. I; Reinstein, supra note 1, at 66.
Reinstein, supra note 1, at 66–67.
Id. at 67.
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with the Moon Treaty, “as requiring that a system be imposed whereby
all development is undertaken by a unified international organization,
with profits spread amongst all nations without regard to involvement.” 162
To those favoring development, interpreting Article I, in effect, to
“mandate . . . wealth redistribution,” would be the end of developing
outer space’s resources.163 Such an interpretation would require that an
international institution would get to “determine what degree of wealth
sharing is fair to ‘all countries.’”164 This would compel the entities that
created and improved the technology for resource extraction as well as
“the financial and physical risks that are part and parcel of the pioneering
development of space . . . to defer to international political consensus.”165
The purpose of the Outer Space Treaty was not to establish a detailed
system of property rights; rather, it was to set out “a general set of
peaceful principles.”166 The result is a treaty that “is riddled with
ambiguities” and unanswered questions with respect to property rights. 167
It says nothing about what “rights parties can claim in celestial bodies”
and under what circumstances “these unspecified property rights might
vest.”168 These ambiguities, especially with respect to the rights of private
enterprises in the resources they develop, can prohibit development of
those resources, almost as much as a system that bans development
completely.169
The second major treaty governing activities in outer space is the
Moon Treaty.170 “The treaty reiterates the OST’s designation of space as
for the exploration and use of all nations. It places the right to explore and
162. Id. “[E]vidence indicates that the U.S. Senate, while debating whether to ratify the
OST, also understood this phrase to require an equitable division of space-borne wealth
among all nations.” Id.
163. Id. at 68.
164. Reinstein, supra note 1, at 68.
165. Id.
166. Johnson, supra note 75, at 1500.
[I]t would be disingenuous to suggest that its text provides a clear statement on
whether private actors may extract mineral resources from celestial bodies. The only
safe conclusion is that the OST’s authority is not limited to states. Presumably, a state
will act to ensure private actors are in compliance with the OST’s principles to avoid
violating the treaty, lest it provoke other states to ignore the treaty. Therefore, further
investigation is required to determine whether a private actor may enjoy the right to
harvest extraterrestrial resources.
Id. at 1503.
167. Wasser, supra note 98, at 58–59.
168. In other words, “what a person must do to gain whatever property rights are available.” Reinstein, supra note 1, at 71.
169. Id.
170. See Moon Treaty, supra note 120; Brehm, supra note 1, at 358.
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use the moon for scientific benefit above private property rights. Finally,
it establishes the moon as ‘the common heritage of all mankind.’”171
However, only thirteen countries have ratified the Moon Treaty; hence it
is binding on only those countries, even though the treaty was extensively
debated in many countries, including in the United States. 172 Thus,
despite its greater specificity, the treaty lacks the support necessary “to
bind non-signatory states.”173 Sarah Coffey calls the Moon Treaty a
“failed treaty” because no country with the capacity to send an expedition
into space is bound by it; indeed all spacefaring nations and most of the
rest of the international community rejected it.174 Nor will any theory of
customary international law bind any country that has not ratified the
treaty because “[t]here is insufficient state practice to claim that the
common heritage doctrine as embodied in the Moon Treaty has become
legal custom.”175 In fact, there are no practices yet in outer space that
might qualify as a basis for legal custom for anything. 176
Article 1 of the Moon Treaty declares that its provisions “shall also
apply to other celestial bodies within the solar system, other than the
earth.”177 Article 6 encourages “freedom of scientific investigation” by
authorizing countries to “collect on and remove from the moon samples
of its mineral and other substances,” while Article 8 allows “exploration
and use of the moon anywhere on or below its surface.”178 Article 6
makes it clear that “such samples shall remain at the disposal of those
States Parties which caused them to be collected and may be used by them
for scientific purposes.”179 Article 8 additionally allows countries to land
171. MacWhorter, supra note 42, at 664 (citing Moon Treaty, supra note 120, arts. 4, 11).
172. Coffey, supra note 29, at 127 (“Although the Moon [Treaty] opened for signatures in
1979, it did not enter into force until 1984 when it was ratified by a fifth country. It is currently
binding only on the thirteen nations that have ratified it.”); see Johnson, supra note 75, at
1497 (“Despite this result, the Moon Treaty has little practical impact on current space law.
Though it entered into force, the treaty does not bind the spacefaring nations because it cannot
regulate the behavior of non-parties without their consent.”).
173. Johnson, supra note 75, at 1494.
174. See Coffey, supra note 29, at 127 (“The Moon [Treaty] is, in effect, a failed treaty
because no nation that has ever performed a manned space flight is bound by it.”).
175. Johnson, supra note 75, at 1497–98. However, “spacefaring nations not party to the
Moon Treaty may be bound by its provisions if the provisions . . . become customary international law.” Id. at 1497. “Nothing . . . precludes a rule set forth in a treaty from becoming
binding upon a third State as a customary rule of international law, recognized as such.” Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 38, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
176. See Johnson, supra note 75, at 1498 (“As for space mining, neither states nor their
private actors have attempted to harvest celestial resources, so there is no demonstrated practice by commission. Since technological hurdles prevent such an attempt at the present time,
there is also no example of state practice by omission.”).
177. Moon Treaty, supra note 120, art. 1.
178. Id. arts. 6, 8.
179. Id. art. 6.
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on the moon and launch space objects from it, and to “[p]lace their
personnel, space vehicles, equipment, facilities, stations, and installations
anywhere on or below the surface of the moon.”180 The treaty also allows
“[p]ersonnel, space vehicles, equipment, facilities, stations, and
installations [to] move or be moved freely over or below the surface of
the moon.”181 But those activities “shall not interfere with the activities
of other States Parties on the moon.”182 Article 9 elaborates on Article 8,
by authorizing states to “establish manned and unmanned stations on the
moon,” but limiting this use to only an area necessary to meet the “needs
of the station,” and not done in a way that might “impede the free
access . . . of other States.”183 These provisions may allow the location of
an unmanned space station on the moon’s surface because doing this does
not amount to possession of the moon’s surface.184
Article 11 declares that “the moon and its natural resources are the
common heritage of mankind” and, among other things, prohibits
“national appropriation by any claim of sovereignty, by means of use or
occupation, or by any other means.”185 Article 11 extends the ban against
physical appropriation of celestial bodies and their resources to nongovernmental entities, stating, in part, that “neither the surface nor the
subsurface of the [m]oon, nor any part thereof or natural resources in
place, shall become property of any State, international
intergovernmental or non-governmental organization, national
organization or non-governmental entity or of any natural person.”186
This provision was included in response to scientists who feared the
possibility of competitive space settlements and wanted the moon
reserved for research only.187 Article 11 also requires “States Parties to
180. Id. art. 8.
181. Id.
182. Moon Treaty, supra note 120, art. 8.
183. Id. art. 9; see also Buxton, supra note 2, at 702.
184. Moon Treaty, supra note 120, art. 9; Buxton, supra note 2, at 702.
185. Moon Treaty, supra note 120, art. 11 (emphasis added). “[T]he very fact that the
framers of the Moon Treaty felt the need to write a new specific ban on private property
indicates that they did not feel the earlier Outer Space Treaty had already accomplished such
a prohibition.” Wasser & Jobes, supra note 98, at 43.
186. Moon Treaty, supra note 120, art. 11; see also Brehm, supra note 1, at 358–59.
187. Wasser & Jobes, supra note 98, at 47–48. Space activist Paul Beich wrote,
[C]apitalism is a disincentive for any activity that does not directly or indirectly result
in the production of wealth for the elite. The profit motive is capitalism’s euphemism
for greed, and greed is a poor motivation for anything, especially the noble and exciting human endeavor of moving into the universe.
Paul Beich, Letters: Will Capitalism Work?, AD ASTRA, May/June 1998, at 3; Wasser &
Jobes, supra note 98, at 48 n.45. This is an example of the view of private property as an
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[the] Agreement . . . to establish an international regime . . . to govern the
exploitation of the natural resources of the moon as such exploitation is
about to become feasible.”188 But the absence of the United States and
Russia, neither of whom has ratified the Treaty, and the limited number
of signatories severely limits the provision’s “practical effect.”189
The most controversial of the Treaty’s provisions is its “common
heritage of mankind” principle,190 which is similar to language in the
Outer Space Treaty that space is the “province of mankind.”191 Under
Article 11’s common heritage of mankind principle, countries do not own
land, but can manage resources in designated international zones.192
Therefore, no individual country has sovereignty over these areas;
international law, including international custom, “governs.” 193 Although
the common heritage of mankind principle is undefined, “subsequent
clauses [in] Article 11 give substance to [that] provision”194 by, among
other things, (1) establishing an international body for directing the use
of outer space’s natural resources; (2) declaring that outer space “is not
subject to national appropriation . . . by means of use or occupation, or
by any other means”; (3) requiring the equitable apportionment of the
benefits from exploitation of the moon, including by countries that do not
have exploratory programs; and (4) requiring the rational management of
the moon’s resources, thereby providing protection and preservation of
these resources for the benefit of mankind.195
Lacking a defined meaning, the phrase can only have limited effect.
“abomination” and which “should be made illegal in the new world of space.” Wasser &
Jobes, supra note 98, at 48; see also Henry R. Hertzfeld & Frans G. von der Dunk, Bringing
Space Law into the Commercial World: Property Rights without Sovereignty, 6 CHI. J. INT’L
L. 81, 91 (2005) (“Corporations exist to make profits, and property rights only matter to the
extent that they are necessary to fulfill the objective of maximizing profit. Popular literature
and the statements of corporate executives gives the impression that unless companies can
obtain ownership to space territory, they will not be able to invest in space activities profitably. But in the reasonably near future, no company operating in space will likely need outright
ownership of space territory, including land on the moon.”).
188. Moon Treaty, supra note 120, art. 11.
189. See Brehm, supra note 1, at 359.
190. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 75, at 1483 (emphasis omitted) (“Much controversy
over space law revolves around a third concept that expands upon res communis omnium—
the common heritage of mankind principle.”); Lynn M. Fountain, Note, Creating Momentum
in Space: Ending the Paralysis Produced by the “Common Heritage of Mankind” Doctrine,
35 CONN. L. REV. 1753, 1759–60 (2003) (arguing that the Common Heritage doctrine should
not apply to outer space because it represents a classic “tragedy of the commons” problem
and fails to efficiently allocate resources).
191. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 119, art. I.
192. See Moon Treaty, supra note 120, art. 11; Buxton, supra note 2, at 691–92.
193. See Moon Treaty, supra note 120, art. 11; Buxton, supra note 2, at 692.
194. Johnson, supra note 75, at 1496.
195. Moon Treaty, supra note 120, art. 11; Johnson, supra note 75, at 1496.
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Nonetheless, it is highly controversial and subject to widely conflicting
interpretations.196 Some argue that the phrase “vaguely” limits property
rights; others go further and say it actually reserves resources “to
common use in line with the Roman law principle of res communis.”197
Brian Abrams assumes that the phrase ‘“province of mankind’ means
ownership of mankind. Thus[,] the [United Nations] or other
[intergovernmental organization] acts as the owner of outer space on
behalf of all mankind.”198 Carol Buxton argues that “[t]he common
heritage of mankind principle deals with international management of
resources within a territory, rather than the territory itself.”199 And David
Johnson criticizes the language because it “goes beyond the principle of
a res communis in that even the ownership of movable resources in a
common heritage area is forbidden without international consent.”200
Non-spacefaring and less developed countries favor an
interpretation that makes clear that “international areas designated for the
common heritage of mankind do not belong to any one sovereign, but
instead to all nations. Therefore, any resource or benefit derived from
those resources, or the use of them, should serve all of mankind.”201 They
consider the principle to create a “common property,” which should be
under “common management,” with one group “possessing exclusive
rights to exploit natural resources and distribute those resources equally
to all nations, regardless of which nations actually funded the effort
(either economically or by developing the technology or both).”202
Buxton finds this interpretation “inherently unfair,” and its application
unlikely to provide an incentive for spacefaring nations to undertake any
expeditions to outer space.203 She argues additionally that this
interpretation robs the principle of any incentive it might have had to
encourage less-developed nations to acquire the know-how to participate
in the Space Age or fund exploration by them or others.204
“Developed nations interpret the principle as meaning that ‘anyone
can exploit these natural resources so long as no single nation claims

196. See id. at 1483.
197. DiMaria, supra note 28, at 423. “[T]he United States and other spacefaring States
opposed the agreement’s use of the res communis ‘common heritage of mankind’ principle,
especially after that same principle caused [the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea] to fail.” Id. at 424.
198. Abrams, supra note 57, at 812 n.90.
199. Buxton, supra note 2, at 692 (emphasis added).
200. Johnson, supra note 75, at 1484 (emphasis omitted).
201. Buxton, supra note 2, at 692.
202. Id. (emphasis added).
203. See id. at 693.
204. Id.
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exclusive jurisdiction’ over the area from which they are recovered.”205
In other words, “every nation enjoys access and each nation must make
the most of that access. The heritage lies in the access to the resources,
not the technology or funding to exploit them.”206 They reason that since
“they spend their time and money developing the technology that enables
them to harvest resources, and they fund the expeditions that collect the
resources, forcing them to share those benefits with countries that have
contributed little or nothing to the effort would be unjust.”207 These
countries do not want the principle included in any new treaties because
it substantially reduces the economic incentive to develop “technology to
exploit natural resources.”208
Given the fact that so few countries have acceded to its terms and its
operative principle is continually controverted, Coffey is right; the treaty
is a failure.209 Kevin MacWhorter attributes this to the unwillingness of
spacefaring countries to accept the treaty’s limitation on property
ownership.210 He compares the Moon Treaty to the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),211 which he says was
accepted globally “because every nation with a coastline stood to gain
from the extension of coastal jurisdiction,” and they, as well as their
citizens, could “benefit from the possibility of unlimited mineral
extraction.”212 This the Moon Treaty did not do.213 Nonetheless, together
with the Outer Space Treaty, it provides the framework for handling
property rights in outer space, and it is to that topic the Article now
turns.214
205. Id.
206. Buxton, supra note 2, at 693.
207. Id.
208. Id. (finding this position “all too clear for capitalistic societies”).
209. See Coffey, supra note 29, at 127.
210. MacWhorter, supra note 42, at 671.
211. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397.
212. MacWhorter, supra note 42, at 671. “The practical difficulties of traveling to space
and carting minerals back to Earth is self-limiting enough to prevent any one company from
obtaining more than its fair share.” Id. But see Reinstein, supra note 1, at 79–80 (criticizing
UNCLOS and its requirements “regarding [the] mining of Earth’s deep seabed”). “The
[UNC]LOS establishes an ‘Authority’ and an ‘Enterprise.’ Mining companies must receive
approval from the Authority. Approval . . . is only granted if the applicant company satisfies
a set of rigorous conditions.” Id. (internal footnotes omitted). Under the first condition, “[t]he
applicant must present two sites of equal value, one of which will be reserved by the Authority
for development by the Enterprise.” Id. “If space law follows the [UNC]LOS’s lead and asks
developed nations to make similarly-excessive sacrifices for the benefit of developing nations,
the same political impasse with the resultant disparate and incoherent legal regimes will no
doubt reoccur.” Id. Although Reinstein disapproves of this proposal, it is none the less interesting. See id. at 79–80.
213. See MacWhorter, supra note 42, at 671.
214. See id. at 657–58.
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III. PROPERTY IN OUTER SPACE
“Space law must take into account private needs and build on private
opportunities; to do this, it must embrace the principle of private property.”215

In our legal system, there are three types of property ownership—
private, public, and communal.216 Private property usually involves a
single owner, either “a legal person like a corporation” or “a natural
person.”217 Public property, on the other hand, is owned by the state or its
agents, while “common property” usually involves at least two entities
who “hold the property in question either as joint tenants or as tenants in
common.”218 If neither of these situations is involved, the property may
be “characterized as null property, open-to-entry property, or res nullius,
and the resources covered by these arrangements are open to use by one
and all without restrictions.”219
The debate over the property ownership provisions of the OST and
the Moon Treaty is between private and common ownership with
commercial interests favoring the first, and those concerned with assuring
the sustainability of outer space resources and equitable access to them
favoring ownership in common.220 This Part explores these two types of
ownership in the context of outer space,221 identifying their benefits and
flaws before concluding that considering outer space as common property
owned by the citizens of the globe is more closely aligned with overarching international principles of how space should be managed.222
At its heart, the debate about property type is about rights in that
property. Property rights, like any other right, are “social artifacts.”223
They are neither fixed nor assumed, and may “vary from one society to
another and over time within the same society.” 224 They consist of
215. Reinstein, supra note 1, at 98.
216. See Oran R. Young, Rights, Rules, and Common Pools: Solving Problems Arising in
Human/Environment Relations, 47 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1, 6 (2007).
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. See id. at 12–13.
221. This Article does not address public ownership because of the clear ban under international law on nations owning property on celestial boundaries, as discussed in Part II. Further, it would be very difficult and contentious to determine which nations own which celestial
body, like the moon or parts of it.
222. “[P]roperty law has an important role in addressing widespread economic inequality
by protecting those goods most essential to the well-being of a broad swath of society, rather
than just protecting the goods that are disproportionately held by the wealthy.” Sheila R. Foster & Christian Iaione, The City as Commons, 34 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 281, 285 (2016).
223. Young, supra note 216, at 5.
224. Id.
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“bundles of rights that can be and often are separated or combined in
complex ways.”225 Some forms of property management, like custodial
or stewardship management, allow for disaggregating those bundles.226
At a minimum, these bundles include possessory rights or the
entitlements of ownership per se, usufructuary rights or rights to make
use of property in specified ways, exclusion rights or rights to prevent
others from using property without permission, and disposition rights
or rights to dispose of property according to the wishes of the owner.227

Some of these rights, such as exclusion rights, the right to prevent access
to or use of the property, and disposition or alienation of the property,
may be problematic in outer space under international law, as discussed
in Part IV.228
Possessory rights, a stick in the property rights bundle, can be
“subdivided.”229 Some of the ways this can be done are discussed in Part
VI and are worth considering in the context of outer space.230 “[E]ven
relatively full bundles of rights are not unlimited or unrestricted.”231
Imagining property regimes of less than full and unimpeded ownership
in outer space is conceivable, as is altering the structure of property rights
to eliminate or lessen perverse incentives, like competition, from the
implementation of those rights.232
For private property rights to emerge out of a common property
regime or from null property where there is no ownership, like outer
space, “cost-effective technologies for measuring, monitoring, and

225. Id. at 6.
226. See discussion infra Part IV (discussing stewardship as a means of managing property
without owning the property); see also Martin Hirschprung, Ownership is Nine-Tenths of Possession: How Disparate Concepts of Ownership Influence Possession Doctrines, 41 VT. L.
REV. 143, 149 (2016) (internal footnote omitted) (“[T]he stewardship model [of property management] facilitates an understanding of resource protection that extends beyond the traditional ownership model and embodies a notion of mutual trusteeship. It also allows for a disaggregation of title, possession, and exclusion.”).
227. Young, supra note 216, at 6.
228. See discussion supra Part IV.
229. Young, supra note 216, at 6 (“Possessory rights can be subdivided as in cases where
owners sell or give away development rights while retaining the rest of the bundle of entitlements, or where different parties share such rights as in systems of common field agriculture
in which one party is entitled to grow crops on the land, while others have rights to graze
cattle on the same land once the crops have been harvested.”).
230. See discussion infra Part VI.
231. Young, supra note 216, at 6.
232. Id. at 8 (“[P]lans for solving a wide range of problems relating to the environment
and natural resources commonly take the form of proposals for altering prevailing structures
of property rights in order to eliminate perverse incentives by creating exclusion mechanisms
or, less often, by encouraging efforts to increase the supply of goods in order to alleviate
conditions of rivalness.”).
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enclosing private property must emerge” to enable the claiming and
transferring of “identiﬁable units of the resource.”233 If there is no private
rights technology or “the distributional cost hurdle is too high, private
property rights cannot emerge because the transaction cost wedge is
simply too large.”234 Instead, “political or regulatory property rights will
emerge.”235 While property rights are continually created and abandoned,
depending on economic conditions, the act of defining property “has a
high fixed cost element,” such as the cost of establishing and defending
boundaries, which can have an effect on the emergence of property
rights.236
One of the problems facing the creation of private property rights in
outer space is the emergence of technology to define those rights in an
area that is without static geographic and political boundaries.237 Another
problem is how to grant, let alone enforce, those rights without violating
international space law that bans the appropriation of outer space and its
resources. So, the presence of potential entrepreneurs eager for the
development of that technology, like Bruce Yandle and Andrew
Morriss’s cattlemen of yore and the development of barbed wire, may not
233. Bruce Yandle & Andrew P. Morriss, The Technologies of Property Rights: Choice
Among Alternative Solutions to Tragedies of the Commons, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 123, 131
(2001).
According to this model, the process begins when the common-access resource is
made more valuable by growing demand. As demand increases, the potential profits
from defining private property rights bring the common access resource to the threshold at which it is worth incurring the transaction costs necessary to define rights.
Id. For property rights to emerge from a commons, any wealth distribution effects must also
be “successfully resolved.” Id.
234. Id. (applying this lesson to the advent of barbed wire, the ability to record and enforce
land ownership, and alienate ownership in the West).
235. Id.
236. Yandle & Morriss, supra note 233, at 135. These costs include defining the boundaries of each tract, development of the means to defend each tract, ranging from fences to
trespass lawsuits, and market protection from force of fraud. Id. at 136. These same types of
cost exist if common land is to be converted to public property like a park, but here there must
be enforceable rule for the park’s use if the land is to be made “regulatory property,” governed
by permits then the terms of the permits must be stated and defended. Id.
237. See Reinstein, supra note 1, at 95 (“[A] right of ownership over space itself, for several reasons, the most basic and fatal of which is that there would be no way to define static
boundaries.”); cf. Zachary C.M. Arnold, Note, Against the Tide: Connecticut Oystering, Hybrid Property, and the Survival of the Commons, Note, 124 YALE L.J. 1206, 1231 (2015)
(“[A]s cultivators pushed further out into the Sound, where town jurisdiction was uncertain
and state regulation nonexistent, disputes seemed sure to multiply.”). Various proposals for
establishing boundaries in the GSO, whether based on extending terrestrial property rights
extending upward from a “negotiated floor” or assigning rights based on gravitation force,
have no application to outer space. See Reinstein, supra note 1, at 96–97; see also Buxton,
supra note 2, at 704–05 (explaining the so-called Bogota Declaration gravitational force).
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stimulate its production because its application would conflict with
international prohibitions.238
Robert Ellickson suggests that “bottom-up, somewhat ad hoc
property systems can [emerge and] reproduce most or all of the benefits
of formal property law with a minimum of economic investment,
procedure, and social disruption.”239 “Informal governance, like formal
regulation, can ‘privatize’ [CPRs]”; Zachery Arnold points to “the
‘lobster gangs’ chronicled by James Acheson” as a “classic example of
informal privatization.”240 Elinor Ostrom writes about how communities
under the right “sociopolitical conditions” can protect valuable CPRs
from over-consumption or damage.241 But, none of these approaches
appears appropriate for circumstances in outer space where small groups
are unlikely to form around CPRs or where communication among
entities will be intermittent at best, making any sharing of informal
management approaches unlikely.242 With this as background, the Article
238. See Yandle & Morriss, supra note 233, at 131–32.
Without the potential customers for a new rights technology offered by private property, entrepreneurs will not invest in creating such technologies. Just as the demand
for a means to exclude others created the incentive for the invention of barbed wire,
so opportunities for entrepreneurs would stimulate the production of new technologies
to provide environmental goods. The regulatory property path forecloses such developments, however, by eliminating the opportunity to profit from developing such
technologies.
Id. at 142–43.
239. Arnold, supra note 237, at 1214.
240. Arnold, supra note 237, at 1215; see James M. Acheson, The Lobster Fiefs Revisited:
Economic and Ecological Effects of Territoriality in the Maine Lobster Industry, in THE
QUESTION OF THE COMMONS: THE CULTURE AND ECOLOGY OF COMMUNAL RESOURCES 37–65
(Bonnie J. McCay & James M. Acheson eds., 1987) (discussing, among other things, why
private property has not emerged in the Maine lobster fishing industry and how Hardin’s tragedy of the commons is avoided).
241. Arnold, supra note 237, at 1215 (“Elinor Ostrom has enumerated sociopolitical conditions under which communities can effectively protect and sustain valuable resources while
maintaining such open systems. She argues that the community enjoying access to the commons must be, among other traits, well-defined and self-governed, so that it is able to define
rights, exclude outsiders, and monitor and discipline insiders as needed.”); see Elinor Ostrom,
Institutional Arrangements for Resolving the Commons Dilemma: Some Contending Approaches, in THE QUESTION OF THE COMMONS, supra note 240, at 250–65 (using two case
studies to examine the validity of theoretical statements about the commons); see also
Pammela Quinn Saunders, A Sea Change off the Coast of Maine: Common Pool Resources
as Cultural Property, 60 EMORY L.J. 1323, 1369 (2011) (“[R]esearch by social scientists concludes that, under the right conditions, groups can cooperate and self-regulate to sustainably
manage CPRs under their control.”).
242. See Foster & Iaione, supra note 222, at 323–25. The authors point out that “Ostrom’s
study focused on small-scale resources affecting a relatively small number of persons ([50] to
15,000) who are heavily dependent on the resource for economic returns.” Id. at 324 n.174.
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describes what space might look like under the two basic property
regimes—private ownership and ownership in common.
A. Space Under a Traditional Private Property Regime
Private property is the cornerstone of American ideals and “a
foundation of the Constitution as well as its philosophical precepts.”243
Indeed, “private property—and individual ownership specifically—runs
throughout the DNA of this Nation.”244 Private property is often
considered a driver of our economy because it creates incentives for
investments in new technology and resource development, both of which
are in play in the development of outer space.245 Property ownership can
also encourage people to care about their property, protect adjacent land
owners from the external effects of activities undertaken on their
property, and assure its sustainability for future generations. 246 Selfinterest can motivate a property owner to preserve their property to attract
future buyers.247 To Richard Posner, the value of possession lies in its
“economic efficiency” because it “tends to allocate resources to those

This raises questions as to its relevance to this Article.
243. M. Alexander Pearl, The Tragedy of the Vital Commons, 45 ENVTL. L. 1021, 1058
(2015). Pearl adds that “this is not necessarily a good thing.” Id. An important insight Pearl
attributes to Carol Rose based on Johnson v. M’Intosh, is that “[i]t seems that individual ownership of property was engrained early in American legal thought and consciousness.” Id. at
1033.
244. Pearl, supra note 243, at 1060; see also Saunders, supra note 241 (“Furthermore,
CPRs can sometimes be the most effective form of resource management. This conclusion
stands in contrast to the traditional assumption, which still permeates U.S. property law, that
resources can be managed only by private ownership or central governmental control.”).
245. See Reinstein, supra note 1, at 74–75 (“So, ideally, celestial bodies should be put to
the uses most beneficial to humanity. This is guaranteed by a system that puts land in the
hands of those for whom the territory is most profitable.”); see also Hanoch Dagan, Why Markets? Welfare, Autonomy, and the Just Society, 117 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 15) (on file with author) (“[B]y allowing people to secure a temporally extended
control of things, property facilitates our ability to carry out (on our own or with the cooperation of others) meaningful projects and pursue comprehensive goals which require a temporal horizon of action.”).
246. See Reinstein, supra note 1, at 78 (“[O]wnership . . . protects the interests of others:
both those nearby (who instantly feel the effects of more care given to, e.g., waste disposal
and water management), and those who come later.”); see also Coffey, supra note 29, at 140
(“[A]llowing ownership of real property on celestial bodies would reduce wasteful use of the
land. . . . If the expeditions owned the land, however, they would have incentive to use it
efficiently and carefully consider all of its possible uses to maximize the investment.”); Pearl,
supra note 243, at 1035 (“Express in Heller’s conclusion is the idea that property should work
toward public goals. Another way of phrasing this is that private property should externalize
some benefits to the public.”).
247. See Coffey, supra note 29, at 140 (“Even if the [outer space] expedition did not extract
all the possible resources, an owner of celestial property would have an incentive to preserve
as much as possible to make it attractive to a future buyer when the expedition sells the land.”).
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persons best able to use them productively, for they are the people most
likely to be willing to incur the costs involved in possession.”248
Possession of property puts the rest of the world on notice of that
possession.249 While possession is most commonly understood as
physically holding onto an object, a more modern view sees it as a “form
of control.”250
But, private property can also “enhance income disparity,
exacerbate[] economic tensions among individuals, and consolidate[]
power among the one percent.”251 M. Alexander Pearl calls property
privatization “a black hole focused solely on centralization of power and
economic wealth without regard to the sustainability of an essential
resource or the communities that depend upon its continued existence.”252
Hanoch Dagan goes further, quoting Eric Posner and Glen Weyl, by
saying,
The key remedy for this predicament is to eradicate the institution of
private ownership. Since “private ownership of any asset, except
homogenous commodities, may hamper allocative efficiency,” we need
to reconstruct markets so they are “competitive by design.” More
precisely, we must discard private property and adopt in its stead a
regime that partly transfers property’s “two most important ‘sticks’”—
the right to use and the right to exclude—”from the possessor to the
public at large.”253

When the value of a resource is increasing, it is more likely to be
privatized so that the entity responsible for developing it can “fully
capture the resulting benefits.”254 Indeed, a movement from common to
private property occurs when the efficiency gains from private property
are more than the costs of creating and maintaining it, such as “the basic
costs of exclusion (fences, guards, and so on) and the extra vigilance
248. Hirschprung, supra note 226, at 147.
249. Id. (“Carol Rose opines that possession forms the basis of property ownership because
of the value of communication through possession. Essentially, possession is notice of an
individual’s ownership to the rest of the world.”).
250. Id. (“A working legal definition must necessarily expand beyond the physical holding
of an object; any definition of possession must trace itself back to that root, possession as a
form of control.”). In differentiating between possession and ownership, “possession was regarded as physical control[,] whereas ownership was regarded as the ultimate right, the title
to property.” Id. at 153.
251. Pearl, supra note 243, at 1059.
252. Id.
253. Dagan, supra note 245, at 7. Dagan further states that Posner and Weyl’s property
proposal is “designed to fix existing markets by supplanting private property with a regime in
which people can only be ‘lessees from society,’ whose ‘lease terminates when a higher‐value
user appears, whereupon the lease is automatically transferred to that user.’” Dagan, supra
note 245, at 4.
254. Arnold, supra note 237, at 1212.
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needed to deter interlopers from absconding with rising-value
resources.”255 This balancing of costs and benefits may be irrelevant in
outer space, as the costs of establishing private property in the first place
would be huge, and the complexity and cost of technological innovations
called for in outer space would be magnitudes greater than what is
required on Earth.256
1. The Positive and Negative Features of Private Property
Many believe that transporting the concept of private property to
space should cause no concern; in fact, they view it positively. 257 “By
guaranteeing rights in extracted minerals taken from space, private
industry could usher all of humanity into a new technological era.”258
Among the advantages of private property ownership in space is the
“reduc[tion] of wasteful use” and the right to transfer alienability to
others, which “would compensate for positive externalities, thereby
creating added incentive to productively develop space.”259 Private
property would also enable colonization of celestial bodies like the
moon.260
In the absence of private ownership, there is the possibility that
“each individual developer will seek to maximize his or her own gain by
extracting as much value as quickly as possible without regard to the
effect on the communal resource.”261 The President’s Commission on
255. Id.
256. Reinstein, supra 1, at 60–61. But see Young, supra note 216, at 4 (“[T]he introduction
of new technologies or new social institutions can transform a non-excludable good into an
excludable good at reasonable cost.”). However, none of the technological innovation examples that Young gives, like time slots governing the use of swimming pools and tennis courts,
even advanced broadcasting methods, which have reduced competition for geomagnetic spectrum slots, are comparable to what would be required in outer space in scope and scale. See
id. at 4.
257. See, e.g., MacWhorter, supra note 42, at 676; Young, supra note 216, at 98.
258. MacWhorter, supra note 42, at 676.
259. Reinstein, supra note 1, at 75; see also Saunders, supra note 241, at 1335 (“Lobstermen in these communities have ‘few if any other ways to make a living on these islands.’
Accordingly, they have always been and continue to be highly motivated ‘to preserve these
resources for themselves’ in order ‘to make a living, and for future generations, if the community [is] to survive.’”).
260. See Reinstein, supra note 241, at 76.
261. Id. at 78; see, e.g., Brehm, supra note 1, at 359–60 (internal footnotes omitted) (“Greg
Nemitz brought suit against NASA seeking declaratory judgment concerning alleged property
rights in the asteroid Eros. Nemitz officially published a claim of ownership to Asteroid 433,
Eros. Eleven months later, NASA’s NEAR Shoemaker spacecraft landed on Eros. Nemitz
sent NASA a twenty-dollar invoice for parking and storage fees. NASA refused to pay and
Nemitz brought suit. Nemitz’s action was dismissed, however, for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted. The court found that Nemitz had failed to establish a legally
recognizable property interest in Eros.”).
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Implementation of U.S. Space Exploration Policy found that although the
idea of private property in space is complicated because of national and
international legal issues, it was imperative that they be addressed early
in the process, “otherwise there will be little significant private sector
activity associated with the development of space resources, one of our
key goals.”262
For those who seek development of space resources, “a reliable
property rights regime will remove impediments to business activities on
these bodies and inspire the commercial confidence necessary to attract
the enormous investments needed for tourism, settlement, construction,
and business development, and for the extraction and utilization of
resources.”263 The resources supporting private space mining companies
are essentially worthless if the companies have no legal right to the
resources they have mined.264 “Without the legal right to use water and
hydrogen mined from celestial bodies, and to alienate platinum group
elements, the potential profitability of private space expeditions collapses
along with the goals of deeper space exploration and settlement.”265 The
lack of a stable private property regime in outer space also means that
space settlements will not be able “to claim sufficient land to yield
enough of the only ‘product’ the settlement can sell profitably enough to
guarantee its survival.”266 The strong belief is that unless private property
rights in outer space and its resources are recognized, commercial
enterprises will be unable to sustain any type of successful commercial
262. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON IMPLEMENTATION OF U.S. SPACE
EXPLORATION POLICY: A JOURNEY TO INSPIRE, INNOVATE, AND DISCOVER 34 (2004),
https://www.nasa.gov/pdf/60736main_M2M_report_small.pdf; see also Wasser & Jobes, supra note 98, at 71–72.
263. Rosanna Sattler, Transporting a Legal System for Property Rights: From Earth to the
Stars, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 23, 27 (2005); see also Brehm, supra note 1, at 379 (“Private property
rights in outer space are the foundation for the future of space exploration.”); Coffey, supra
note 29, at 147 (“A stable legal framework will encourage progress by assuring expeditions
that they will legally own the resources they extract.”).
264. Brehm, supra note 1, at 355.
265. Id.
Without the United States or other national governments recognizing property interests in outer space and celestial bodies, individuals and private entities lack the ability
to sustain successful commercial outer space material extraction enterprises. Additionally, this concern is compounded by the position some commentators on space
law hold, that if a nation were to recognize such property rights, recognition ‘would
constitute a de facto exclusion of other states and their nationals, and thereby constitute a form of national appropriation.’ Accordingly, this national appropriation would
violate Article II of the Outer Space Treaty.
Id. at 360.
266. Wasser & Jobes, supra note 98, at 68.
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activities in outer space.267
The absence of “‘security derived from ownership and sovereign
control, [means that] entities that might be interested in the development
of space resources will be reluctant to undertake [the] expensive and risky
path’ implicit in all space travel”268 without some return on their
investment.269 In all likelihood, such a return would be “in the form of the
right to exploit limited areas of space and in proceeds from the sale of
space resources.”270 This uncertainty arguably leaves a large “legal void,
a wasteland of indeterminacy and instability.”271 According to Reinstein,
“Unless people and nations are encouraged to exploit the riches of space,
humanity will never know their benefit. And the more we are able to
exploit, the more humanity stands to benefit. If commercialization is to
be successful, space law must encourage investment in outer space
development.”272
But, recognition of private property claims by the United States or
by any other country could violate Article II of the OST’s prohibition
against the national appropriation of space resources, including the
surface of celestial objects.273 “[E]ven well-crafted domestic legislation
that carefully addresses international law issues would create a significant
risk of frustrating the explicit terms of the Outer Space Treaty, the intent
and purpose of the treaty, or both.”274 No nation, including the United
267. See Brehm, supra note 1, at 360 (“[T]his concern is compounded by the position some
commentators on space law hold, that if a nation were to recognize such property rights,
recognition ‘would constitute a de facto exclusion of other states and their nationals, and
thereby constitute a form of national appropriation.’ Accordingly, this national appropriation
would violate Article II of the Outer Space Treaty.”).
268. Widgerow, supra note 22, at 492.
269. Id. at 519.
270. Id. “It is necessary to cater to these businesses because competition and individual
ingenuity lead to advancement in ideas and technology, and because . . . state-run space programs are beset by limited budgets, taxpayer reticence, and shifting political attitudes.” Id.
271. Reinstein, supra note 1, at 72.
272. Id.
273. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 119, art. II; Brehm, supra note 1, at 362; see also
MacWhorter supra note 42, at 661 (“A majority of scholars agree that real property ownership
in space is illegal, or at the very least unenforceable. The OST, however, only bars claims of
“celestial bodies,” but not extracted materials.”).
274. Brehm, supra note 1, at 365.
In this regard, if the United States is to hold true to the overarching goal of promoting
‘the common interest of all mankind in the progress of the exploration and use of outer
space for peaceful purposes,’ domestic legislation would be insufficient as the sole
means of establishing a private property regime in outer space and may be discarded
as a problematic approach.
Id.
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States, can independently alter the current international legal framework
governing activities in outer space.275 And amending the OST to strike
the language is unlikely, since the ban against appropriation of property
in outer space is a “fundamental tenet of the treaty.”276
Coffey believes that
full ownership rights further [violate] the OST by disregarding the
concerns of developing nations. If lunar real estate were put on the
market, only the wealthy, developed nations and their citizens would be
able to purchase it. If developing nations tried to purchase land later
when they could afford it, they would be at a disadvantage because the
prime locations are likely to be taken and the land’s current owners
could demand whatever price they wanted. This could perpetuate
current disparities of wealth and resources on Earth to the [m]oon and
outer space.277

This would be in violation of the Treaty’s intent as expressed in Article I
that outer space and its resources shall be the “province of all
mankind.”278 Ownership of space real estate could also lead to speculative
purchases, the goal being not to develop the property, but to hold it until
market conditions are more favorable, and then sell it for a large profit—
again, leading to the exclusion of poorer nations from the market.279 In
all likelihood, the international community would react unfavorably to “a
private property regime in outer space” because it would be perceived as
benefiting large space-faring nations, like the United States and Russia,
“at the expense of nations that do not have such capabilities.”280 But
restricting ownership to anything less than fee simple absolute, like a
lease or a license,281 means that the rights-holder could not alienate their
property in any way, which decreases any significant incentive to acquire
the right in the first place.282
275. See id. at 374 (“[I]t is not the prerogative of the U.S. government, or any government,
to implement unilateral legislation that would significantly alter outer space and the current
space law framework. It would frustrate the common conception of outer space as a free and
open place, as well as the current legal framework, to simply enact domestic legislation that
allows for the acquisition of private property rights in outer space.”). However, Brehm notes
that “the Outer Space Treaty is silent on the issue of commercial extraction of resources.” Id.
at 373.
276. Coffey, supra note 29, at 141. Coffey believes that an amendment is “unthinkable,”
certainly before expeditions to the moon happen. Id.
277. Id.
278. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 119, art. I.; Coffey, supra note 29, at 125–26.
279. See Coffey, supra note 29, at 141–42.
280. Brehm, supra note 1, at 372. Brehm added that “it would be no easy task to gain
international support for an agreement to establish a system of private property rights in outer
space without aggravating numerous non-spacefaring nations.” Id.
281. Abrams, supra note 57, at 811–12.
282. See id. at 812 (“Granting inalienable territory would likely decrease the incentive of
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2. The Rule of First Possession
The “most extreme proposal” with respect to implementing a
property regime in outer space is to apply “first possession rules.”283
Under these rules, a country could claim territory it discovered, and then
decide whether “to open up settlement in its new territory to its own
citizens or to the international community as a whole.”284 Within its own
territory, the discovering nation’s sovereignty “would extend to its outer
space territory, where it could govern as it pleased.”285 Such an approach
would directly conflict with international space law forbidding countries
from appropriating outer space or its resources.286 MacWhorter also
worries that a first possession rule in space could devolve into “a space
race and colonialism in a situation that requires limitation and prudence,”
and would be difficult to sell to other nations, especially non-space faring
ones.287 If the rules were applied to commercial enterprises, without a
“centralized mechanism for demarcating the property” 288—such as a
sovereign289—the inevitable result would be disputes among putative
property owners, like what happened in the West during the
homesteading era.290 Reinstein agrees: “If the rule of ownership was no
more than ‘first come, first served,’ with ownership going to the first
person to grab a celestial body, an unmitigated land-rush would ensue.”291

private entities to purchase it from an IGO. The more sticks in the bundle of property rights
one receives, the more likely one is to buy.”).
283. Id. at 810–11 (“Perhaps the most extreme proposal is to open up outer space following
first possession rules. This proposal treats celestial bodies as real property and allocates property rights along a ‘first in time, first in right’ rule similar to homesteading in the nineteenth
century United States.”); see also Hirschprung, supra note 226, at 162 (“First possession rules
are common to a variety of legal schemes across the broadest range of cultures, including
Native American, African, Civil, and Islamic law.”).
284. Abrams, supra note 57, at 811.
285. Id.
286. See MacWhorter, supra note 42, at 667–68.
287. See id. at 670.
288. Abrams, supra note 57, at 810–11.
289. MacWhorter, supra note 42, at 670 (“First possession works well in the context of
Earth, because a sovereign has claim to the property first. In all of the author’s examples,
including Johnson v. M’Intosh, homesteading, and the General Mining Statute of 1872, private individuals came into possession of property after a sovereign—through principles of
law—granted those claims. They can protect private claims, because the property is within
the umbrella of the sovereign.”).
290. See Abrams, supra note 57, at 810–11.
291. Reinstein, supra note 1, at 84–85; see also Reavan, supra note 129, at 257 (“Many
still question the wisdom of a U.S. law creating commercial property rights. Some commentators suggest that the impact of passing the [U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness
Act of 2015 (USCSLC)] will not be on international law, but rather on international politics.
It is also reasonable to suggest that the USCSLC could trigger mirroring legislation in other
space-faring nations, which could create heated competition, controversy, and possibly
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But MacWhorter also believes that limited property rights under a first
possession rule might be an “appropriate first step,” if, for example, the
property claim extended no further than to the claimed materials brought
back to Earth.292
Those who are concerned that less technically adept nations would
be severely disadvantaged by a property rights regime that is premised
“on the ‘right of [first] grab,’ the first-come, first-served theory of
property acquisition,” oppose such an approach.293 “By the time spaceincapable nations develop the technological prowess and capital reserves
to fund meaningful development of outer space, the earlier space-faring
nations [and their citizens], left unchecked, might already have locked up
the most accessible and valuable resources.”294 This would carry forward
current disparities in global wealth distribution into the “Space Age.” 295
The argument against a right of first possession gains salience from
the fact that prior wrongs inflicted on less developed countries may be
the reason they are not “space-capable.”296 This inequitable situation
would persist, as those who profit from private property rules like the
right of first possession will have the political ties, money, and
understanding of the “rules of the game” to prevent their reform.297 An
additional problem with the proposal is its enforceability. The fact that
outer space is infinite makes it more difficult to “police” and to enforce

chaos.”); cf. Abrams, supra note 57 (“It is conceivable that in the future human behavior beyond Earth’s boundaries will more closely resemble the extent and nature of human activity
on Earth.”). Reinstein adds that since the amount of wealth a claimant might receive depends
on their being first in time, the result will be “the criminality and outright sabotage witnessed
in the American West of the gold rush era.” Reinstein, supra note 1, at 84–85.
292. MacWhorter, supra note 42, at 670.
293. Reinstein, supra note 1, at 64.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 64–65; see also Arnold, supra note 237, at 1213 (“The key for understanding . . .
variation in property rights institutions is recognizing that the property rights that are devised
to reduce the wastes of the common pool simultaneously define a distribution of wealth and
political power.”). Later in his article, Reinstein notes that “[i]n the absence of prior existing
property rights, . . . there seems to be nothing inherently immoral about a right of grab.” Reinstein, supra note 1, at 79. But, a right of grab still “may severely disadvantage the lowertech nations in [the] future.” Id.
296. Reinstein, supra note 1, at 79 (“The perpetuation of past wrongs thus makes the right
of grab doubly objectionable in the eyes of developing nations.”). Reinstein provides two
answers to this issue: “First, the universe, for practical purposes, is not finite. Whenever developing nations become space-capable, there will be plenty of available unused space real
estate. Second, corporations based in space-incapable nations could, of course, contract out
to a space launch company from a space-capable nation.” Id.
297. Arnold, supra note 237 (“Current owners of resources are also more likely to have
developed strategic political ties and an understanding of the ‘rules of the game’ that will aid
them in lobbying against reform.”).
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the various treaties that apply to it.298 In outer space, “a breaching private
party could pursue its interests outside the scope of such an agreement
with relative impunity before it was discovered by the relevant
international authority.”299
3. Less than Fee Ownership
There are less than fee ownership property regimes that can give the
holder of a defeasible fee all the rights of an owner with complete title to
the property, except the right to alienate it.300 Thus, “leaseholds, licenses,
reversionary interest, easements, and covenants” might work well in
outer space without violating international laws.301 There are also three
types of defeasible fees that might be useful in outer space.302 “Defeasible
fees, unlike fee simple absolute,” might convey property to a company,
but are encumbered by an “automatic reversion or right of entry
interest.”303 The first of these is a “fee simple subject to condition
subsequent.”304 These conditions, “if triggered, would revert the realty
back into the control of the multinational community.” 305 So to the extent
space resources have been appropriated, the withdrawal is not
permanent.306
Then there is a “fee simple determinable,” which is like a fee simple
subject to condition subsequent, “except that a fee simple determinable

298. See Widgerow, supra note 22, at 507.
299. Id.; see also Young, supra note 216, at 12–13 (“When the areas involved are large
and government agencies are poorly endowed with capacity and resources, individual users
may exploit the relevant resources without worrying about the impact of enforcement operations.”).
300. See Widgerow, supra note 22, at 513.
301. Id. at 513.
[A] new property law regime, modeled after U.S. common law property principles,
can open outer space to private ventures while retaining the best aspects of the common sovereignty philosophy at the heart of current space law. Although this argument
concedes that exclusive possession of any portion of space, the planets, and other celestial bodies is both inconceivable under space law and undesirable, it argues that a
system of leaseholds, licenses, reversionary interests, easements, and covenants are
ideal for a newly configured space law regime.
Id. at 494.
302. Id. at 511.
303. Id. at 513.
304. Widgerow, supra note 22, at 511.
305. Id. at 513.
306. See id. at 513; see also Saunders, supra note 241, at 1386 (“[G]eneral statutory recognition of a small group’s right to stake property or property-like claims (such as legally enforceable usufructuary claims) would eliminate the type of politics that led to the controversial
recommendation of the subzone task force committee.”).

BABCOCK FINAL ARTICLE

230

6/20/2019 1:28 PM

Syracuse Law Review

[Vol. 69:191

creates an automatic reversion to the grantor upon the occurrence of the
condition—the grantor need not assert the right of reverter in order to
reestablish possession of the property.” 307 A third type of defeasible fee
is a “fee simple subject to executory limitation[, which] reverts ownership
upon the occurrence of a specified event or condition not back to the
grantor, but to an heir or third party.”308 In each of these situations, a fee
simple is less than absolute because it can revert back to the grantor or a
third party if some later condition occurs.309 In the case of development
of outer space resources, examples of later changes in circumstances that
could revert title to the grantor might be those that damage the resource
or make its continued development non-sustainable, or the developer’s
violation of international law or any terms regulating or otherwise
limiting their actions.
Leases and licenses are additional examples of impermanent types
of property transfers.310 While a lease transfers exclusive possession of
property from a grantor to a grantee, the transfer is only for a limited
period of time; a license does not transfer any property and merely allows
one party to use property that is managed and controlled by another
party.311 Then there are easements, which “are rights, conveyed with the
property.”312 Easements generally allow the property owner who owns
the transferred property to continue to make some specified use of it.313
A negative easement, on the other hand, allows the entity that transferred
property to prohibit the person who received it from using it in a specified
way.314 Covenants are found in property conveyances and may prevent
the grantee from using the property in some specific way. 315
In each situation, not only is less than a full fee interest in property

307. Widgerow, supra note 22, at 511.
308. Id.
309. See id. at 511.
310. Id. at 512.
311. Id.
312. Widgerow, supra note 22, at 512 (describing life estates where the estate terminates
when the holder dies, at which point the estate can revert back to the grantor or a third party).
However, these appear of limited utility in outer space this early in space development. See
id. at 513.
313. Id. at 512.
314. Id.
315. Id. at 512–13 (“A covenant is an agreement between the grantor and grantee in a
property conveyance that particular actions or conditions will or will not arise in connection
with the grantee’s possession of the property. More specifically, a negative covenant restricts
the grantee from performing a specified action in connection with the property, and a restrictive covenant limits the use of the property by the grantee in some way. . . . [A]ffirmative
[covenants require] that the grantee perform some action or maintain some situation as a condition of the conveyance.”).
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conveyed, but that interest can be restricted in a multitude of ways. 316 In
some situations, when the restrictive conditions are not complied with,
the property can revert back to its original holder; in other cases, the
reversion is automatic if conditions contained in the grant occur. 317 But,
each situation is predicated on some entity owning or holding the
property in question, which would violate the terms of international space
law unless the entity was some international authority. 318 An international
organization could establish specific rules governing activities in outer
space, oversee their implementation, and enforce them.319 The
International Seabed Authority (ISA), established by UNCLOS, could
serve as a model for such an authority. 320 The ISA was established in
1994 and since then it has issued new regulations governing exploring
and prospecting for marine mineral resources and has contracted with
seven nations granting them exclusive fifteen-year prospecting rights.321
However, “[t]here are drawbacks to forming a new international
body to oversee the exploitation of space resources.”322 They can be
expensive to establish and support.323 Non-spacefaring nations might not
want to invest money in a venture which might “freeze them out of the
decision-making process and put them at a disadvantage if they someday
are able to participate in lunar missions.”324 There are the inevitable
questions that arise whenever a new international governing organization
is created, such as whether it should be under the authority of the United
Nations or be completely independent, and how power should be
allocated between spacefaring nations and developing countries without
the expertise of money to venture into space.325 Further, there is an
underlying equity question about spending money to create a new

316. See Widgerow, supra note 22, at 511–13.
317. See id. at 511–12.
318. Id. at 513.
319. See Coffey, supra note 29, at 133. “This proposal aligns with [A]rticle 11(5) of the
Moon [Treaty], which requires that an international regime be created to govern the exploitation of natural resources on the moon when such exploitation is about to become feasible.”
Id.
320. See id. at 134 (“The ISA is divided into separate bodies with designated functions.
Every party to UNCLOS is represented in the Assembly, which makes decisions about sharing
mining revenues and considers problems of a general nature. The Assembly appoints seats in
the ISA’s executive body, the Council, to ensure that both developing nations and those with
a substantial interest in mining are represented. Remaining seats are distributed to assure equitable geographic distribution.”).
321. See id. at 135.
322. Id. at 136.
323. Coffey, supra note 29, at 136.
324. Id.
325. Id.
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administrative authority.326 That authority will spend money that might
otherwise have helped poorer countries develop the capacity to
participate in outer space directly.327
An alternative to creating a new entity and new laws to administer a
private property system in outer space is to extend terrestrial property law
to outer space.328 Coffey proposes dividing the ISS between participating
nations and then allowing each participant nation to apply its law to its
assigned portion.329 But, this alternative suffers from some of the same
flaws that establishing a centralized authority suffers—namely, it allows
the powerful countries to control activities in outer space, specifically
access.330 It allows those countries to collectively “set precedent for
property rights in space instead of establishing formal international laws
that the international community agrees upon.” 331 The proposal
“disregards the ‘common heritage’ provision of the OST,” because it
completely excludes developing nations, who likely are not participants
in the ISS, and provides them with no benefits from resources derived
from space unless they eventually become technically proficient.332
Allowing countries to dictate any agreement that governs behavior in
outer space also presents a risk that a country may be excluded from
participation for unrelated reasons, like “diplomatic problems between
the nations, unwillingness to share equipment and resources, or pressure
from other members.”333
Thus, while establishing a private property regime in outer space
might encourage development of celestial resources, it is hard to design
a way around the ban against appropriating property and to establish a
326. See id.
327. See id. (“There is also questionable value in creating a structure which is supposed to
allocate profits and benefits to developing countries but which consumes funds that might
have otherwise been put toward helping those nations directly.”); see also DiMaria, supra
note 28, at 437–38 (“Protecting the resource interests of nonspacefaring countries represents
a further issue in forming this organization. One possible solution entails language that results
in resource sharing only after the entity that obtained the resources makes a fair profit for its
risk. Alternatively, this organization could set a flat rate, obtaining a small portion of all resources acquired and distributing them to nonspacefaring members of the organization.”).
328. Coffey, supra note 29, at 142 (discussing such a proposal with respect to the ISS).
329. See id. (“Each member registers its own components of the ISS and retains jurisdiction over them subject to provisions of overall station management. Thus, Russian law governs in the sections Russia contributed to the space station, and American law governs in the
modules that the United States supplied.”).
330. See id. at 144.
331. Id. at 143. “This means that when other nations eventually do participate in such activities, they likely will be bound by customary law that they did not play a role in shaping
and that is disadvantageous to them.” Id. at 143–44.
332. Coffey, supra note 29, at 144.
333. Id.
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system that is both workable and protects the interests of less developed
countries.
B. Space Under a Commons Property Regime
This Section discusses what about space makes it more like a
commons than private property. Indeed, early space treaties treated space
as though it was a commons.334 But, like private property, commons also
have negative features that may be problematic in space, and simply
declaring something a commons does not dictate the rules under which it
should be managed. When various commons management approaches are
tried, like the law of first possession under a private property regime, they
are also found wanting.335
1. Early Treaties and Analogous Areas of the Globe
Early treaties, such as the 1968 Agreement on the Rescue of
Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts, and the Return of Objects Launched
into Outer Space, which “requires space-faring nations to rescue stranded
astronauts and wayward objects and return them to the appropriate
country,” “envisions space as a commons beyond the possession and
control of any one nation or people.”336 So too, the 1972 Convention on
International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, which “was
established to resolve concerns over financial liability in the event that a
spacecraft or other space machine causes damage to other space-based or
[e]arth-bound assets,” and the 1975 Convention on Registration of
Objects Launched into Outer Space, which “imposes a requirement that
states maintain and submit to the [United Nations] thorough records of
all objects launched into outer space.”337
Indeed, the 1967 OST “allocates the use of orbital space as if it were
a common property resource”338 by declaring outer space an open access
resource and banning appropriation by any country.339 Jared Taylor notes
that “during the Treaty’s preliminary negotiations, one drafter analogized
the absence of property rights in space to the absence of property rights
334. Taylor, supra note 31, at 259–60; Widgerow, supra note 22 at 504.
335. See Pearl, supra note 243, at 1036 (“Economic principles recognize that depending
on ‘whether the resources are common pool or amenable to privatization, particular natural
resource configurations, technological constraints, and transactions costs may make common
property a superior solution to private property.’”).
336. Widgerow, supra note 22, at 504 (citing Rescue Treaty, supra note 122).
337. Id. (first citing Space Liability Treaty, supra note 121; and then citing Convention on
Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, opened for signature Jan. 14, 1975, 28
U.S.T. 695, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15).
338. Taylor, supra note 31, at 259.
339. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 119, arts. I–II.
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in the ocean.”340 According to Taylor, later treaties, as well as the
practices engaged in by spacefaring nations and private companies, “have
confirmed the spirit of the Outer Space Treaty: space is a resource from
which no nation or private entity can be excluded”341—a true open access
commons.342
The 1959 Antarctic Treaty343 established “the foundation for
international space law.”344 Like outer space, Antarctica and the oceans
“presented a dilemma regarding habitation and defense. No nation
occupied these territories and no nation desired a ‘race to own’ without a
guarantee of who would emerge victorious.”345 Both the Antarctic Treaty
and the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act (the “Deep Seabed
Act”)346 eschewed the concept of private property as well as the rights of
first possession, in part, because the riches of those areas might allow
developing nations to share in those riches as opposed to remaining
economically marginalized.347 The Deep Seabed Act provides a model
for how to regulate activities in a commons, like outer space, which it
manages to do without privatizing the marine resource.348 As a result, it
is “customary and accepted legal reasoning” to analogize between private
340. Taylor, supra note 31, at 259.
341. Id. at 259–60.
342. See Nevala, supra note 34, at 1512.
Even though a satellite appears on a State’s registry, the private owner retains his
property rights in the satellite. Under the Outer Space Treaty, ‘[a] State Party to the
Treaty on whose registry an object launched into outer space is carried shall retain
jurisdiction and control over such object.’ . . . Furthermore, the [OST] establishes that
themere [sic] fact that an individual launches an object into space does not impact his
ownership.
Id. at 1512–13 (internal footnotes omitted). Since “property rights are essentially expressions
of sovereignty, questions arise as to whether governments can extend their property laws to
objects in outer space.” Id. at 1513.
343. Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, 402 U.N.T.S. 71.
344. Brehm, supra note 1, at 357. “[A]s early as 1958, scholars recognized that space law
could draw on the Antarctic model, as another territory ‘placed under an internationalized or
“trust” arrangement.’” Johnson, supra note 75, at 1493 n.84. “In September 1960, President
Dwight D. Eisenhower proposed that the principles of the Antarctic Treaty be used to form
an international agreement governing outer space.” Brehm, supra note 1, at 357.
345. Buxton, supra note 2, at 691; see also Johnson, supra note 75, at 1515 (“Space is
indeed very much like the high seas in that it is physically difficult to maintain exclusive
control over a given area.”).
346. Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, Pub. L. No. 96-283, 94 Stat. 553 (1980)
(codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. §§ 1401–1542 (2012)).
347. Buxton, supra note 2, at 691; Widgerow, supra note 22, at 509.
348. 30 U.S.C. § 1402(a); Widgerow, supra note 22, at 509. “Thus, the Deep Seabed Act
is a notable achievement in that it succeeds in spurring and protecting private investment in
an area of the global commons while simultaneously reserving such areas as the ‘common
heritage of mankind.’” Widgerow, supra note 22, at 509.
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ownership rights outside of national sovereignty, like those the Deep
Seabed Act granted, and a “land claims recognition law for celestial
bodies.”349
“The oceans and Antarctica . . . have much in common with the
moon. They can be harsh environments that are difficult to reach to
extract minerals [and are resource rich]. They are also designated
international areas in which no nation has a sovereign claim.”350 The
history of the earth’s oceans is a progression from “the domain of
conquering armadas and privateers, when good legal title required as little
as arbitrary lines drawn on a map,” to the concept of a “free sea” open to
all countries, where no single country could “obstruct the use of that
privilege.”351 International space law built on that history of open passage
and “free sea.”352 The roots of the idea of granting non-space faring
nations right of access can also be found in the 1958 Geneva Convention
on the High Seas, which granted “landlocked states the right to sail the
oceans by requiring their coastal neighbors to grant free passage over land
and through territorial waters.”353 The legal framework of UNCLOS
united “a broad spectrum of national and private interests into a shared
agreement on the possession and usage of a seemingly borderless area of
the global commons,” setting another useful precedent for outer space.354
However, UNCLOS, as a model, is impractical in “the vast reaches of
outer space”—space is simply too vast and unlimited.355
2. Common Property
Common property is property, the rights to which belong to more
than one entity.356 Like private property, common property is endemic to
349. Wasser & Jobes, supra note 98, at 62; see also Widgerow, supra note 22, at 509
(“Specifically, Section 3 of the Deep Seabed Act, entitled, ‘Disclaimer of Extraterritorial Sovereignty,’ states that the United States ‘exercises its jurisdiction over United States citizens
and vessels . . . in the exercise of the high seas freedom to engage in exploration for, and
commercial recovery of, hard mineral resources of the deep seabed in accordance with generally accepted principles of international law,’ but that the United States ‘does not thereby
assert sovereignty or exclusive rights or jurisdiction over, or the ownership of, any areas or
resources in the deep seabed.’”). But see Young, supra note 216, at 7. Although “[v]arious
forms of land ownership have emerged and played influential roles in most societies over
several thousand years[,] . . . there are few parallel practices pertaining to marine systems or
seas and oceans,” which have more in common with space than terrestrial property. Id.
350. Coffey, supra note 29, at 129.
351. Johnson, supra note 75, at 1488.
352. See id. at 1489.
353. Id. (citing Convention on the High Seas art. 3, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 450
U.N.T.S. 82).
354. See Widgerow, supra note 22, at 507.
355. Id.
356. See Saunders, supra note 241, at 1357. “Because law typically evolves incrementally,

BABCOCK FINAL ARTICLE

236

6/20/2019 1:28 PM

Syracuse Law Review

[Vol. 69:191

life in the United States and always has been, even though many
Americans view it ambivalently. 357 There is considerable overlap
between property held in common and that which is privately owned.
Carol Rose suggests that collective, but privately owned property, like a
tenancy in common, “has all the hallmarks of individual private
property,” and, therefore, should not be seen as “fundamentally
problematic or prone to inefficient use.”358 Additionally, the plasticity of
the commons, demonstrated by the appearance of new commons, like the
“knowledge commons, cultural commons, infrastructure commons, and
neighborhood commons,” indicates that the concept might fit in outer
space.359
A commons, or CPR, is frequently asserted to resist “privatization
and/or commodification of those resources,” making it oppositional to a
claim that something is private property. 360 Sheila Foster and Christian
Iaione’s suggestion that the “language of the ‘commons’” is often used
to prevent the enclosure of public urban space “by economic elites,”
resonates with the situation in outer space where wealthy countries or
private companies want to claim or enclose space that the public owns.361
A claim that something is a commons acknowledges that “it is a shared
resource that belongs to all of its inhabitants,”362 like outer space, which
a group-level right is most likely to emerge as the logical extension of an analogous right that
is already well accepted.” Id. at 1328. “If property law does develop like water law, it will
increasingly exist as a collection of use-rights, rights defined in specific contexts and in terms
of similar rights held by other people.” Eric T. Freyfogle, Context and Accommodation in
Modern Property Law, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1529, 1531 (1989).
357. See Pearl, supra note 243, at 1060–61 (“Rose explored the American legal culture’s
deeply ingrained skepticism of collective ownership of property and the marginalization of
community property forms.”).
358. Id. at 1032–33; see also Foster & Iaione, supra note 222, at 292–93 (“Rose found that
some British courts considered these resources [ones used by the public, like for Maypole
dancing,] ‘inherently public property,’ on the basis of the enhanced value that public use generated, and vested in the public the right to use property otherwise subject to exclusive private
control.”). “Rose famously described commons ownership structures as ‘commons on the inside’ and ‘[private] property on the outside.’” Pearl, supra note 243, at 1051.
359. Foster & Iaione, supra note 222, at 284 (“More recently, scholars across an array of
specialties have conceptualized and articulated new kinds of commons, beyond those recognized in the traditional fields of property and environmental law. These ‘new’ commons include knowledge commons, cultural commons, infrastructure
commons, and neighborhood commons, among others.”).
360. Id. at 283–84. “[T]he commons is less a description of the resource and its characteristics and more of a normative claim to the resource. In these situations, the claim is to open
up (or to re-open) access to a good—i.e., to recognize the community’s right to access and to
use a resource which might otherwise be under exclusive private or public control—on account of the social value or utility that such access would generate or produce for the community.” Id. at 287 (internal footnotes omitted).
361. See id. at 283.
362. Id. at 287.
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is the “province of all mankind.”363
But there are problems with the idea of declaring anything a
commons, just like there are problems with declaring something private
property. One problem with the commons approach is the inability to
exclude members of the commons from using the resource.364 Lacking
the right to exclude, a user of CPRs has no incentive to do anything other
than fully exploit the commons because if she refrains, her co-users
will.365 The result is an “open access resource vulnerable to the tragic
conditions of rivalry, overexploitation, and degradation.”366 Another
problem is that since under a commons property regime the rights and
interests of the present generation dominate those of future generations,
there is no assurance that the claims of an unidentified future generation
will have any effect on how the commons is managed.367 There are also

363. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 119, art. I.
364. Pearl, supra note 243, at 1053 (“The absence of the right to exclude is what allows
the tragedy of the ‘privatized commons’ to exist.”).
Ostrom frames the problem of collective action as an absence of the right to exclude.
In an unmanaged commons, a member of the group “cannot be excluded from obtaining the benefits of a collective good once the good is produced.” There is no legal
right for anyone to oust another individual. Therefore, there is “little incentive to contribute voluntarily to the provision of that good.”
Id. at 1030 (internal footnotes omitted).
365. Id. at 1029 (“The right to exclude . . . is the basis for incorporating the needs of future
generations in the present management of the CPR.”).
366. Foster & Iaione, supra note 222, at 287.
Limited-access commons are able to avoid tragic outcomes because they operate
through a set of explicit or implicit usage and membership constraints designed to
protect against overconsumption and exploitation. On the other hand, truly open access resources, like Hardin’s pasture, in which exclusion is impossible or costly, are
vulnerable to the tendency toward rivalry, exploitation and degradation or exhaustion
of the resources.
Id. at 292 (internal footnote omitted). However, Rose has noted that “there are some openaccess resources, particularly land, in which increased use does not create rivalry but rather
enhanced utility or value for the public, such that these resources become essential or highly
functional resources for city inhabitants.” Id.
367. See Pearl, supra note 243, at 1028–29 (“In effect, an owner of a private right to use
land acts as a broker whose wealth depends on how well he takes into account the competing
claims of the present and the future. But with communal rights there is no broker, and the
claims of the present generation will be given an uneconomically large weight in determining
the intensity with which the land is worked. Future generations might desire to pay present
generations enough to change the present intensity of land usage. But they have no living
agent to place their claims on the market. Under a communal property system, should a living
person pay others to reduce the rate at which they work the land, he would not gain anything
of value for his efforts.”).
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management difficulties.368 “Under a communal system, one member
wishing to preserve the CPR for future generations’ use faces
significant—and perhaps insurmountable—transaction costs of
negotiating with all members of the community and paying them to use
the resource suboptimally.”369 And, exiting a commons when group
action causes individual harm, without destroying “social gains from
cooperation,” can be difficult.370
There is no one-size-fits-all solution to these problems, and there
may be multiple approaches to the development of solutions. 371 In the
search for solutions, various legal scholars have promoted variations on
the concept of a commons, highlighting different features.372 Pearl
proposes something he labels the “vital commons,” which includes CPRs
that are “essential to human existence,” like air or water, and which may
require a different approach to their management.373 Pearl’s vital
commons has five key traits:
(1) the benefits of the CPR are internalized by nearly all members of a
given massive population; (2) the costs of the CPR’s depletion are
externalized among nearly all members of that same massive
population; (3) augmentation or depletion of the CPR by one party
affects the ability to use the CPR by another party within the same
massive population; (4) the CPR itself is necessary for sustenance; and
5) damage or depletion of the CPR is non-remediable or extremely
difficult to correct.374

Outer space has most of these traits—the potentially affected

368. See id. at 1033 (“Rose makes an important distinction between the forms of collective
management of CPRs. On the one hand, she notes the well-known lobster fishing community
that has institutions which govern the resource in a sustainable manner. However, she notes
that the institutions operate via low-level violence.”).
369. Id. at 1029. “Heller points out that while there may very well be circumstances where
commons resources are inefficiently overused, excessive privatization of a commons resource
may result in underuse, which is similarly inefficient.” Id. at 1034.
370. Id. at 1035–36 (internal footnotes omitted) (“Heller and Dagan . . . posit that preserving the right to exit is an essential attribute of a liberal commons and must exist. At a minimum, it must exist as a form of self-defense from harm caused by the group. The other component of their goal is to promote cooperation while maximizing economic gains and
recognizing social value. Cooperation can result in benefits of economies of scale and risk
spreading.”).
371. Young, supra note 216, at 15.
372. See Pearl, supra note 243, at 1029–38 (outlining the variations on the commons of
multiple legal scholars, including Elinor Ostrom, Carol Rose, Hanoch Dagan, Michael Heller,
and Lee Anne Fennell). From her work on the commons, Ostrom concludes that an error of
CPR scholars is “oversimplification.” Id. at 1032.
373. Id. at 1040. “Two types of CPRs immediately meet this definition: major groundwater
aquifers and the [e]arth’s atmosphere.” Id. at 1041
374. Id. at 1041.
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population is the entire globe; its resources, as far as is known, are not
renewable; and the benefits and costs of development of outer space
resources could be widely internalized or externalized.375 Additionally,
restoration of any depleted resources in outer space may be difficult, and
the impact on any of those resources may be so dire that its overuse and
depletion could be “the epitome of apocalypse.”376 Finally, the vastness
of outer space makes it difficult to subject it to “local” regulation—i.e.,
regulation by individual nations, which might opt not to regulate certain
activities or to regulate lightly.377
Similar to Garrett Hardin’s open pasture, a major problem with a
commons is that, “absent a system that allocates use rights, it is difficult,
if not impossible, to restrain the impulse of users to pursue their
individual self-interests, even when pursuit of those interests result in the
degradation or exhaustion of the resource.”378 This is why, he argued,
“‘freedom in the commons’—i.e., the lack of controls on individual
behavior and self-interest—ultimately leads to its ruin and hence to the
‘tragedy.’”379 If the amount of use of a CPR or the intensity of that use is
too much, then the result can be “congestion” that decreases the values of
those resources.380 “Similarly, certain types of uses can create
375. See Reinstein, supra note 1, at 59.
376. Pearl, supra note 243, at 1053.
377. See Pearl, supra note 243, at 1056–57 (“The problem with allowing certain areas to
be unregulated or lightly regulated is that the Ogallala Aquifer is not susceptible to parceling
out differential rules. The aquifer stretches across eight states . . . .”).
378. Foster & Iaione, supra note 222, at 295.
379. Id.; see also Arnold, supra note 237, at 1233–34 (quoting SHELL FISH COMM’RS OF
THE STATE OF CONN., THIRD REPORT OF THE SHELL FISH COMMISSIONERS, Jan. Sess., at 13
(1884)) (“The state commissioners described this problem as a classic tragedy of the commons: . . . ‘In the free scramble for the oysters, [the natural growthers] have no thought but
“to keep what they get and catch what they can,” and it would be lost time to them to dredge
for stars while others dredge for oysters.’”); Pearl, supra note 243, at 1040 (“Three traits
clearly exist in any tragedy of the commons: (1) resource scarcity, (2) internalization of benefits, and (3) the externalization of costs.”). The key to creating a tragedy is the imbalance
between resources and consumers of those resources. Id. “Fennell suggests that there are many
reasons why people make ‘suboptimal decisions with regard to resources under common or
interdependent control.’ Participants ‘may lack information or the means to communicate
with each other, they may fall prey to cognitive biases or strong emotions, or they may suffer
from wealth, liquidity, or power differentials that leave some options unavailable.’” Id. at
1038. Oran Young uses limited fish stocks to make this point, saying, “So long as supply
demonstrably and reliably exceeds the demand of all the members of the user group, the absence of rights and rules may not matter much. In other words, a system of null property may
be perfectly acceptable under these circumstances. The problem occurs when rising demand
exceeds supply.” Young, supra note 216, at 11.
380. See Foster & Iaione, supra note 222, at 297 (“Too much usage, either in volume or
intensity, of a park or a neighborhood street, for example, can quickly result in the kind of
congestion that degrades these spaces.”); see also Pearl, supra note 243, at 1027 (“Hardin
reminds us of Aristotle’s maxim. ‘That which is common to the greatest number [of people]
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incompatibilities with many ordinary uses and conservation of such
spaces, creating the conditions for rivalry or subtractability.” 381
The unbounded nature of space and the variety and wealth of its
resources is already attracting potential users with competing or
conflicting ideas about how space should be used.382 Even if space was
regulated, this “magnetic pull” to occupy and develop space may create
rivalry among different users, especially if those users are drawn to the
same areas of outer space.383 Unless the development of outer space
resources is regulated, too many entities vying for the same resource
could lead not only to congestion and rivalous behavior, 384 but also to
accidents and serious conflict—the conditions the space treaties are
intended to avoid.385
has the least care bestowed on it.’”). “The point is that the kind of open spaces, or commons,
that are an essential part of cities and that give cities much of their value can be contested in
ways that require rethinking the governance and management of those spaces.” Foster &
Iaione, supra note 222, at 298.
381. Foster & Iaione, supra note 222, at 298. “There is no one system that can satisfactorily
mediate the tensions that arise from rivalry for common resources, nor that can resolve distributional inequalities with regard to those resources.” Id. at 334.
382. See Reinstein, supra note 1, at 63–64.
383. Cf. Foster & Iaione, supra note 222, at 312 (“[C]onventional zoning, and other land
use laws, also fall short of being able to comprehensively and satisfactorily manage or govern
the city commons. . . . [T]he openness of cities and the variety of commons within them inevitably invite rivalry as different users are drawn to agglomerate in cities. This seemingly
magnetic pull, along with the strain of proximity of heterogeneous users, creates the pre-conditions for rivalry even in heavily regulated spaces.”).
384. Id. at 298–99. Foster and Iaione contend that the tragedy of many city commons arises
from “weakly or poorly regulated space . . . [also known as] ‘regulatory slippage.’ In other
words, these are spaces that were perhaps once heavily regulated to avoid rivalry but where
such control has slipped, for whatever reason, significantly behind previous levels of public
control or management.” Id. “[U]nrestrained competition for collectively shared resources
intensifies and the existing regulatory infrastructure is (or becomes) inadequate to manage
[the] rivalry.” Id. at 312.
385. As noted earlier in this Article, developing an effective regulatory framework for activities in outer space is difficult to do given the absence of a single regulatory sovereign. See
discussion supra Part II. Jessica Coulter writes about the Pacific Garbage Patch, pointing out
that
“[i]ndividual consumers and manufacturers do not directly bear the costs of the negative externalities that result from plastic escaping into the sea. They do, however,
realize benefits from plastic consumption . . . [j]ust as there is no international framework that holds individual actors responsible for climate change, there is no international obligation for nations to compensate an injured party for damage incurred from
land-based marine pollution. Because no one nation has regulatory authority over or
liability for waste problems in the Pacific Ocean, nations lack motivation to solve the
problem alone.”
Jessica R. Coulter, A Sea Change to Change the Sea: Stopping the Spread of the Pacific Garbage Parch with Small-Scale Environmental Legislation, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1959,
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The way to prevent a tragedy on land held in common is not
necessarily its transformation to private property, which is one solution
Hardin called for.386 Oran Young says “[i]nstitutional innovation,” like
individual transferable quotas, “can create a form of private property and,
in the process, alleviate the perverse incentives arising from the condition
of non-excludability.”387 Creating public property or, in the alternative,
using regulatory controls can also avoid the tragedy to the commons.388
The owners of a commons can also self-regulate to control the adverse
effects of non-excludability.389
But as Young notes, while each approach has its plus side, each
approach, like privatization, can also have negative effects.390
“Privatization can lead to outcomes that are grossly unfair[, and]
[g]overnments [may] lack both the capacity and the will to manage public
property well.”391 And common property approaches can lead to nonsustainable use of the property, and “work best in situations where the
sense of community is strong and social pressure is capable of controlling
behavior effectively”—characteristics uncommon in outer space.392
So, we have learned thus far that (1) the race is on to extract valuable
resources from outer space and celestial bodies;393 (2) the international
legal framework governing those activities is far from complete, inviting
behavior that may be in the economic best interests of the actor, but not
necessarily of the globe;394 (3) the international legal principles
governing this behavior may be counter-productive when it comes to
incentivizing economic behavior, but beneficial non-spacefaring

1964–65 (2010).
386. See Young, supra note 216, at 8 (“Well-known but divergent prescriptions, in this
context, call for a transition to private property through the creation of exclusion mechanisms
(e.g., effective fences) or for a transition to public property through actions on the part of a
government agency to claim ownership and impose restrictions on the use of the relevant
resources (e.g., rules governing the harvesting of wildlife).”).
387. Id. at 12.
388. Id.
389. Id. (“Common property systems also can and often do give rise to restrictions on the
behavior of individual users that serve to avoid or alleviate the tragedy of the commons.”).
390. Id.
391. Young, supra note 216, at 12.
392. Id.; see also Saunders, supra note 241, at 1349 (“Ostrom concludes that a small, homogenous group that is highly dependent on the resource in question and has the autonomy
to make binding rules will be more likely to develop informal rules than groups that do not
share those qualities, or which share them to a lesser extent.”). “[C]ommon property arrangements are generally inadequate to manage human uses of highly migratory resources.” Young,
supra note 216, at 13.
393. See, e.g., Brehm, supra note 1.
394. See, e.g., Reinstein, supra note 1, at 62–63.
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countries;395 and (4) the push to privatize space, which is clearly a global
commons, may lead to rivalrous behavior, which could dissolve into
military activity and squeeze out poorer countries from the benefits of
space, in direct contradiction of the goals of international space law.396
We have also learned that while privatizing open access areas, like
outer space, is not necessarily good or necessary to avoid the tragedy of
the commons (the over-utilization of common or shared pool resources),
the features of a commons make it difficult to avoid that tragedy and to
provide for future generations.397 So the solution may lie in crafting new
property regimes, perhaps combining the best features of both
approaches. It is to that task this Article now turns—the circumstances in
which new forms of property might emerge and what they might be.
IV. NEW TYPES OF PROPERTY REGIMES THAT MIGHT WORK IN OUTER
SPACE
The rapidly closing gap in the technological ability of countries and
private companies to develop resources in outer space makes it
imperative to find a property regime that will allow management of those
activities. Uncontrolled activities in outer space could lead to conflict
among countries and commercial enterprises, as well as irreparable
damage to and over-consumption of those resources.398 But the problems
with both property regimes studied in Part III raise the question of
whether a new form of property might allow for a more successful
management approach.
Generally, the process of changing from one property regime to
another requires that certain conditions occur, such as changes in
technology, the means of economic production, or in social
circumstances.399 However, property in outer space is more like null
property to which no claim of ownership has yet been made.400 Hence,
the situation here does not involve changing from one type of property to

395. See, e.g., Buxton, supra note 2, at 692–93.
396. See, e.g., Coffey, supra note 29, at 125.
397. See Foster & Iaione, supra note 222, at 295.
398. See id.
399. See Arnold, supra note 237, at 1212 (“[W]hen changes in the circumstances of economic production make it more profitable to society as a whole to establish a new property
regime, such a regime will tend to emerge, whether through legislation, judicial decisions, or
the evolution of social mores.”). In his article, Arnold describes the changes in the property
regime governing oystering in Connecticut, calling the natural oyster beds an “anomaly.” See
id. at 1235. “Under this system, valuable beds were subjected to a common property system
that reduced output and promoted waste. Yet, despite its disadvantages, this system persisted
for decades.” Id.
400. See Young, supra note 216, at 6 (discussing the concept of null property).
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another. Rather, it calls for the creation of a new type of property, one
that can function in an unfamiliar world and open that world to terrestrial
activities in an unregulated environment. These factors might create the
circumstances in which a new form of property emerge.
One new type is “hybrid property,” which combines different types
of property.401 Hybrid property regimes sometimes emerge because they
perform a particular political function.402 Here, the political function
would be the enablement of an effective regulatory regime in outer space.
Hybrid property can improve the efficiency and stability of traditional
property regimes and can encourage the creation of important social
goods.403 An example of a hybrid property regime is one that is
sometimes private and sometimes common; for example, where private
property may be open for collective uses.404 Public dedication “reflects a
peculiar hybrid doctrine which grants private rights in public spaces
based on the reliance interests of those who purchased land—typically at
higher prices—on the understanding that adjacent land would remain
subject to public use.”405 One might find a hybrid property regime in outer
space where land that has been temporarily enclosed to allow some
development activity to take place is also open to public use, like
government-sponsored scientific research or privately sponsored tourism.
“Property hybridity can emerge and survive not only when it is

401. Arnold, supra note 237, at 1211 (“[R]eality often contradicts the conventional tale of
evolution toward efficient formal privatization and that alternative property systems often
prove viable because they fulfill important societal needs—economic and otherwise. . . .
[T]hese viable alternative property systems include hybrid regimes—that is, regimes that impose different property rules at different points in space or time.”); id. at 1247 (“[M]any forms
of property regulation other than formal privatization can promote economic efficiency, including internally heterogeneous, or hybrid, property systems, as Connecticut’s experience
demonstrates.”).
402. Id. at 1211 (“[H]ybrid regimes can emerge and thrive because of their political functions.”).
403. Id. at 1216.
404. See id. at 1216–17 (internal footnotes omitted) (“[Henry] Smith coined the term ‘semicommons’ to describe a regime in which a resource is sometimes common and sometimes
private, and in which ‘both common and private uses are important and impact significantly
on each other.’ Smith illustrated the semicommons concept through the apparently inefficient
but surprisingly durable medieval open-field system. Under this regime, land was held and
farmed privately most of the time, but at certain times the private right to exclude was suspended to allow for grazing by the village’s collective herd across all parcels. . . . [H]ybrid
regimes benefit from regulation, whether formal or informal, to prevent individuals from exploiting hybridity to their benefit but to the community’s detriment.”).
405. Foster & Iaione, supra note 222, at 319. There is a danger that this doctrine can be
used in a way that enables property owners to “act solely in their self-interest, without any
democratic check, and in ways that are not clearly in the public interest or even for the benefit
of the particular public space.” Id. at 319–20.
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economically optimal but also when it fulfills political imperatives.” 406 If
the political imperative in outer space is to develop some form of property
regime that meets the needs of public and private investors in space while
providing access for non-space faring nations and their citizens, then
maybe some form of hybridity that allows for overlapping forms of
property or governance should be used rather than exclusive zones where
one form of property is allowed and another is not allowed.407 There may
be political support for “such a spatial compromise” where the hybrid
regime preserves and strengthens “existing informal governance
mechanisms in open-access areas.”408 Further, these hybrid regimes,
because of the role of local—even community-based—government, may
avoid some of the back-channel dealings that disfavor entities, in this case
disempowered countries and their citizens.409 But where there is
“jurisdictional complexity”—i.e., the involvement of many jurisdictions
in the affected area—it may be more difficult to work out the
arrangements among those jurisdictions to achieve any form of hybridity,
overlapping or spatial.410
The problem with establishing a spatially hybrid property regime (or
any property regime) in outer space is the lack of definable boundaries
where one type of approach might be possible in one area, and another in
a different area, or even overlapping regimes in the same area.411 But the
idea of co-locating disparate property regimes in a single area that overlap
either temporally or spatially may reduce the need to have separate
defined areas where one property regime is based on private property
precepts and the other on common ownership. Regardless of which
approach is adopted—common property, private property, or some form
of hybrid property—“efficient privatization does not inevitably triumph
in property law and [ ] ultimately no single regime may triumph.”412 If
anything, the rational tilt may be towards preserving public access to
CPRs and to “push privatization further elsewhere rather than bringing
406. Arnold, supra note 237, at 1247.
407. See id. at 1248.
408. Id.
409. See id.
410. See id. at 1248 n.201 (“The jurisdictional complexity of the Chesapeake, which is
split between two states, may also have complicated negotiation toward a grand bargain along
the lines of Connecticut’s 1881 reforms, and the state’s political structure may have also conspired against compromise.”).
411. But see Arnold, supra note 237, at 1248 (“[F]ederal and state policymakers are increasingly embracing marine spatial planning, in which sub-areas of the ocean are defined
and subjected to different property rules (for example, rules that allow or forbid private leasing
for energy production) as a politically and economically expedient alternative to traditional,
more spatially uniform maritime regulation.”).
412. Id. at 1247 (drawing from research on oystering in Connecticut’s waters).
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all areas under a regime that embodies both open access and private
property features.”413
Another property model is stewardship.414 Most scholars assume
that “the classic property ownership concept is associated with traditional
rights of alienability, title, and exclusion; and, it tends to overlook the
possibility of non-owners exercising custodial duties over tangible and
intangible goods in the absence of title and possession.”415 The
“stewardship” model of property assumes that those who actually possess
the property may not be its “ultimate owners.”416
At the core of the stewardship model is the idea that “mankind is a
steward of natural resources, especially [of] globally important
[ones].”417 It “embodies a notion of mutual trusteeship.”418 The model
permits title, possession, and exclusion to be disaggregated from each
other.419 This enables the refiguring of “the rights of possession, use, and
production among non-owners as well as owners.”420 Complete control
of something is neither required nor does it guarantee possession of that
thing.421 The fact that ownership of property is not necessary makes it
attractive from the standpoint of international law. However, there are no
rights implicit in stewardship and only duties with respect to the
property.422 This makes it less attractive to those who want some return
for their investment in space development.423 Thus, it offers less of an
incentive to explore outer space, as well as no assurance about any
equitable distribution of any benefits from development.424
But, regardless of the type of property regime, how property will be
managed in outer space is still to be determined. Various management
approaches are discussed below in Part V.
413. Id. at 1248.
414. Hirschprung, supra note 226, at 149.
415. Id.
416. Id.
417. See Coulter, supra note 385, at 1995 (“Effective environmental legislation embodies
the notion that mankind is a steward of natural resources, especially globally important resources like the Pacific Ocean. Small policies can encourage widespread acceptance of the
environmental moral imperative . . . .”).
418. Hirschprung, supra note 226, at 149–50.
419. Id. at 150.
420. Id.
421. Id. at 151.
422. Hirschprung notes that some who favor stewardship as a way to define ownership
emphasize its “potential” to reform copyright law “by emphasizing the duties to the public
that correlate with ownership rights.” See id. at 150.
423. See Reinstein, supra note 1, at 72 (suggesting that a degree of certainty is necessary
to encourage investment and that for space development to be possible, investors must receive
an early return on their investment).
424. See id.
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V. HOW TO MANAGE PROPERTY IN OUTER SPACE
[W]e must accord the highest priority to efforts to solve or avoid the
tragedy of the commons, the free rider problem, and the harmful impacts of side effects as they arise in connection with human/environment
relations. For the most part, success in this endeavor will depend on
our ability both to understand the sources of perverse incentives and to
devise systems of rights and rules or, in other words, governance systems capable of altering incentives sufficiently to alleviate problems of
this sort.425

The lack of property lines or boundaries in outer space make it
difficult to delineate an individual claim to ownership, which could lead
to overlapping and conflicting claims of development rights. Assertion of
ownership rights over space and its resources conflicts with the ban on
appropriation of outer space in the governing treaties and could lead to
rivalrous conditions, perhaps even to war. Without a management system
that assures equitable access to and sharing of celestial resources, any
form of property regime runs the risk of violating the equitable principles
that animate the OST and Moon Treaty—that space should be developed
for the benefit of all mankind.426
The Article, to this point, has established that outer space is closer
to a global commons than it is to private property. Yet, treating space as
a global commons, as noted previously, poses a unique management
problem: how to design a management approach that protects open access
commons resources from overconsumption or damage while still
incentivizing the development of those resources. Hardin believed that
privatization of property was the best way to achieve efficiency and
sustainability, Ellickson argued that informal norms were the best way to
achieve “sustainable equilibrium,” and Ostrom promoted “a range of
management techniques specific to that community in order to redirect
the march towards total exhaustion.”427 While these ideas do not work in
isolation for space, they each contribute in some way to a solution.

425. See Young, supra note 216, at 16.
426. See Reinstein, supra note 1, at 72.
427. Pearl, supra note 243, at 1047; see also Foster & Iaione, supra note 222, at 288 (“Hardin famously postulated that threats of degradation and destruction of the commons give rise
to either a system of centralized public regulation or the imposition of private property rights
in order to avoid the ‘tragedy.’ Ostrom’s groundbreaking work, on the other hand, demonstrated that there are options for commons management that are neither exclusively public nor
exclusively private. Ostrom identified groups of users who were able to cooperate to create
and enforce rules for using and managing natural resources—such as grazing land, fisheries,
forests and irrigation waters—using ‘rich mixtures of public and private instrumentalities.’”).
But see Pearl, supra note 243, at 1061 (“Ostrom’s model [of self-management] works under
certain conditions—typically small CPRs—but the Ogallala is not among them.”).
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This Part identifies some management approaches designed to
achieve those goals from the right of first possession rule to the
application of norms, and evaluates each one for its suitability and ability
to meet the dual goals of equitably and sustainably allowing the profitable
development of outer space resources, as well as for its efficiency,
fairness, cost effectiveness, and ease of implementation and enforcement.
One conundrum is that
not only does one size not fit all, but also there are apt to be multiple
approaches to the development of solutions. To take a single example,
any effort to avoid or alleviate the tragedy of the commons must include
the creation of some sort of exclusion mechanism or system for
rationing available supplies of the relevant good(s) or service(s) among
prospective users. But it turns out that there are distinctive ways to meet
this condition under structures of private property, common property,
or public property.428

This Part also shows that there are a number of solutions whose effects
are comparable in terms of conservation, but are significantly different
when criteria like “efficiency, equity, or robustness” are examined.429
A. Hybrid Governance
Hybrid forms of governance are a way of managing property.430 An
example of a hybrid governance regime is a “nested governance system,”
in which one form of governance, self- or local governance, is nested in
a larger, “centralized governance regime.”431 In this management
scenario, the public authority, which acts as a designer and mediator of
these co-designed systems, becomes a “collaborative institutional
ecosystem [of] manager[s]” enabling “the networks, actions and reactions
of others in the ecosystem [to be] independent and free [while] nested

428. Young, supra note 216, at 16.
429. Id.
430. Arnold, supra note 237, at 1217.
431. Foster & Iaione, supra note 222, at 324–25 (internal footnotes omitted) (“In usermanaged scenarios, individuals exist in an interdependent relationship with each other and
with the resource, and are strongly motivated to overcome collective action problems, collaboratively manage the resource, and enhance their productivity over time. In many of these
cases, users are able to enforce and monitor their rules only with the help of external state
agencies on whom they rely in instituting a complex, ‘nested’ governance system to regulate
the resource but without subsuming these institutions into a centralized governance regime. . . . Both formal and non-formal groups alike rely to some extent on the local government to facilitate or enable their activities in managing and governing the commons. In this
sense, they are ‘nested’ governance regimes that ‘claim’ the urban resource as an open-access
common resource, allowing some class of users to work cooperatively and collaboratively to
care for and manage it.”).
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within the local government, consistent with a polycentric system.”432
Elected officials “assist, collaborate, and provide technical guidance
(data, legal advice, communication strategy, design strategies,
sustainability models, etc.) to enable themselves to manage, mediate, and
coordinate the ecosystem.”433 The public official becomes a manager who
enables and supports “parts of the ecosystem to allow it to ‘nest’ within
the larger policy of the city.”434 Arnold calls this nested system of
governance a “spatially hybrid property regime.”435 Given the different
levels of government that might be involved in outer space—
international, national, and even local—nested hybridity might become a
reality.
Another hybrid form of governing property, particularly commons,
which contains separate, yet overlapping power centers is called
“subsidiarity.”436 “Subsidiarity is the idea that power should be shared
with ‘the lowest practicable tier of social organization, public or
private.’”437 It is based on the impression that “governments look for
allies at different hierarchical levels to facilitate the initiatives of
proactive citizens who, individually or in groups, are willing to take direct
care of the commons.”438 Space-faring nations could involve subunits of
government in the actual management of space, like states, provinces, and
towns, as well as special interest groups that might benefit from the
development of space, like universities or space development
enterprises.439 Foster and Iaione use horizontal subsidiarity as a means of
432. Id. at 336. “The challenge of networked governance may be that its structure resembles a loosely coupled system, subject to fraying at the margins and not glued together enough
to be organizationally coherent.” Id. at 335.
433. Id. at 336.
434. Id.
435. Arnold, supra note 237, at 1246; see also Pearl, supra note 243, at 1035 (“In the
Liberal Commons, Heller and Dagan seek to demonstrate the benefits of ‘synthesizing features of existing [property] types, private and commons, to create vigorous hybrids including
the liberal commons.’”).
436. Foster & Iaione, supra note 222, at 288–89 (“In this article, we tease[d] out . . . a set
of democratic design principles that can be replicated to manage or govern a range of shared
urban goods and resources. These principles—horizontal subsidiarity, collaboration, and polycentrism—reorient public authorities away from a monopoly position over the use and management of common assets and toward a shared, collaborative governance approach. In other
words, the Leviathan state gradually becomes what we call the facilitator, or enabling, state.”).
437. Id. at 325–26. “The governance regime for shared urban resources becomes one without a dominant center but instead one in which all actors who have a stake in the commons
are part of an autonomous center of decision making as co-partners, or co-collaborators, coordinated and enabled by the public authority.” Id. at 289. However, Foster and Iaione warn
that “although loosely coupled systems may be adaptive, they can lose consistency and predictability if repeatedly confronted with abrupt and unpredictable change.” Id. at 335.
438. Id. at 327.
439. See Foster & Iaione, supra note 222, at 326–27. “Horizontal subsidiarity thus prompts
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engaging an active urban citizenry in maintaining the city for the
collective welfare of its citizens.440 However, there is no reason to limit
the principle’s application to the urban environment. Indeed, the goal of
reorienting “public authorities away from the central state to an active
citizenry willing to cooperatively govern common resources” seems
equally useful in outer space where there are similar sub-governing
units.441 Indeed, to the extent this approach breaks the tie between the
space development industry and government and the industry’s push to
realize the principle of first possession, subsidiarity as a management
principle may hold some merit, if adjusted to meet the physical
circumstances of outer space.442 And a nested system of governance or
subsidiarity could involve interested parties in governance providing for
more local resolution of conflicts, if and when there are regulations to
apply.
B. Application of the Right of First Possession Property Rule
As noted previously, the space industry favors allowing ownership
of property in outer space because it enables them to profit from their
investment in the development of space resources and counter balances
the risks of each venture they undertake.443 They argue that “[o]wnership
governments to look for, and accept, allies to facilitate the initiatives of proactive citizens
who, individually or in groups, are willing to take direct care of the common assets of the city.
In a sense, the government is looking to share the responsibility of caring for common goods
with an active citizenry. This ‘sharing’ implies that citizens are willing to act for the general
interest—to be a city-maker rather than just a city-user.” Id. at 327 (emphasis added).
440. See id. at 326.
441. Id. at 328. Foster and Iaione also recommend a “polycentric system of governance,”
which reduces the state to providing these subgroups with the “necessary tools (including
appropriate public policies packaged as collaborative devices), connecting the several networks of actors, and helping the so-called ‘collaborative class’ to enlarge the boundaries of
innovation. In this kind of system, ‘many elements are capable of making mutual adjustments
for ordering their relationships with one another within a general systems of rules where each
element acts with interdependence of other elements.’” Id. at 333. But, polycentric governance appears too chaotic and indeterminate to be an appropriate form of governance for outer
space, and reduces the power of a central authority too low to effectively regulate and enforce
activities in outer space. The scale of managing outer space compared to managing activities
in an urban environment is too disproportionate to apply its lessons to outer space.
442. Cf. Foster & Iaione, supra note 222, at 313 (“The reigning account of the politics of
urban land use decisions, the ‘growth machine’ account, situates land use officials as acting
in concert with an elite coalition of developers and real estate interests primarily concerned
with economic growth.”).
443. Brehm, supra note 1, at 374–75 (“By creating a system in which private entities can
establish real property rights in their space objects and a surrounding safety zone, the proposal
incentivizes private investment of large sums into space exploration programs. Provisions
which authorize the right to exclude, the right to be free from interference, the exclusive right
to appropriate resources within an established safety zone, and the right to sell real property
further encourage private space exploration and create strong associated incentives.”); see
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rights would also provide incentives for expeditions to make the initial
treks to the moon”444 and “would allow a free market to develop in
property rights” on celestial bodies like asteroids or the moon.445 Critical
to protecting those investments is the right of first possession.446 But, as
also discussed earlier, “full ownership” of property in outer space, like
the surface of an asteroid or the moon, violates Article II of the Outer
Space Treaty, making any implementing rule a nullity. 447
One approach around the ban, allowing application of the principle,
might be to create “a real property rights system based on jurisdictional
sovereignty” distinguishing “between absolute territorial sovereignty and
functional or jurisdictional sovereignty.”448 An essential part of this
proposal is to permit “private entities to occupy locations on a first-come,
first-served basis so long as the occupation does not interfere with the
activities of other entities.”449 The proposal “would permit private
property rights in outer space once a private entity made effective use of
the property for a period of one year, and continued to use the property
in a peaceful way that allowed for free and open use of outer space.”450
The genesis of this proposal, according to Andrew Brehm, are the
Homestead Acts, “which similarly encouraged private exploration and
settlement in new frontiers.”451 The key elements of this proposal are the
non-interference requirement and the diligence requirement.452 But,
eventually, the land transferred to the homesteader, which was the
incentive for undertaking the hard work in the first place.453
Other scholars have advocated using the General Mining Law of
1872 (GML).454 The GML not only gave the first discoverer of a valuable
mineral the exclusive right to develop it, but also to the land around the
discovery.455 Ownership of the land remained in the United States until

also Coffey, supra note 29, at 139 (“[T]he clearest, most efficient solution to the space resources question would simply be to allow comprehensive property rights, including real estate ownership, in space.”).
444. Coffey, supra note 29, at 140.
445. Id. at 141.
446. See id.
447. Id. “While the OST allows a constrained claim to space resources, it does not allow
the right to exclude under [A]rticle I’s guarantee of free access to all areas of celestial bodies.”
Id. at 139.
448. Brehm, supra note 1, at 366.
449. Id. at 367–68.
450. Id. at 368.
451. Id. at 369.
452. See id. at 368.
453. See Brehm, supra note 1, at 369.
454. MacWhorter, supra note 42, at 667.
455. Id.
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the discovering entity perfected its claim, at which point the land
transferred to the miner.456 At that point, the proposal runs afoul of the
OST ban, just like using the Homestead Act as a model.457 Another reason
the models will not work in outer space is that the United States originally
owned the land before it was transferred to a private entity. 458 As no
sovereign owns land in outer space, there is no sovereign to transfer
anything to anybody.459 Therefore, the right of first possession rule under
any approach cannot get over the non-appropriation hurdle of the
international space treaties, regardless of any other attributes they may
have, and is unworkable.
C. Establish Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) Like Those Under
UNCLOS
One approach that has captured the attention of some space law
scholars is the idea of establishing development or enterprise zones on
celestial bodies.460 Under this approach, existing organizations could
allocate areas on celestial bodies for the construction of installations by
different countries “with the understanding that a certain exclusive
economic zone would radiate from that location.”461 Nations could then
allow activities to occur in those zones and regulate them.462
“Alternatively, an international organization could divide celestial bodies
into shares for each country to presently or eventually exploit, as opposed
to a system of arising economic zones.”463
The EEZ proposal is not that different from traditional Euclidian
zoning to the extent it “separates incompatible land uses and excludes
harmful ones to avoid negative spillovers” from the co-location of
conflicting uses.464 Zoning can also be used to “control the kind of users
allowed to consume the commons by excluding those who are likely to
take out more than what might be considered their fair share of the
commons and leave everyone worse off, at least fiscally.”465

456. See id. at 668, 670.
457. See id. at 668.
458. See id.
459. MacWhorter, supra note 42, at 668 (“The situation in space—where no sovereign
may lay claim—is far different from the effort to exploit the American West.”).
460. See DiMaria supra note 28, at 433 (“Some scholars have argued that the successful
middle ground [between res communis and res nullius] lies in exclusive zones for States to
encourage industry but avoid giving spacefarers free reign.”).
461. Id. at 436.
462. See id.
463. Id. at 436–37.
464. Foster & Iaione, supra note 222, at 310.
465. Id.
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Separating incompatible land uses and excluding those who might
over-consume the commons might be a useful approach in outer space, if
the obstacles to creating it can be overcome, which they cannot. The fact
that the proposal assures development rights for countries creates several
problems. First, creating an exclusive zone from which some entities are
excluded in all likelihood would “directly interfere with the free
exploration and use principles in Article I of the Outer Space Treaty.” 466
Second, the proposal’s administration requires the presence of an
international organization, with its attendant problems.467 Third, given
the difficulty tracking asteroids, monitoring and enforcing what happens
within these zones may be very difficult.468 Fourth, depending on the
perceived fairness of the zones and the allocation process, the proposal
could lead to “discord” among various countries causing the possible
dissolution of whatever civility norms had been established among
spacefaring nations.469
The zoning proposals to date have focused on single uses,
principally mining.470 It is possible, however, that as conditions on the
moon, for example, become more useful for other uses, such as a place
from which to launch ventures into deeper outer space or for extracting
water for use in situ or elsewhere, there may be more than one activity
occurring in a single zone. One way to avoid one activity interfering with
the use by another is the use of “performance zoning,” an idea Lee Anne
Fennell proposed to allow for the agglomeration of beneficial uses to
produce positive impacts within the zone as well as beneficial spillover
impacts.471 Another is to adopt the idea of “poolism,” the “co-production
of goods” and adoption of “sharing practices” in a single space, like in a
city.472 For such an idea to work, there would have to be a system of
466. DiMaria, supra note 28, at 437.
467. Id. at 436–37 (discussing these problems).
468. Id. at 437; see also Abrams, supra note 57, at 813 (“One key characteristic of asteroids
is that they are more difficult to track than planets or real estate on Earth. This makes an
asteroid seem more like a chattel, which may be lost.”).
469. Cf. Saunders, supra note 241, at 1384 (discussing the establishment of zones with
specific restrictions which fractured existing community norms).
470. See, e.g., MacWhorter, supra note 42, at 667.
471. Foster & Iaione, supra note 222, at 312 (internal footnote omitted) (“Because we cannot rely upon markets to assemble urban participants optimally or to maximize the positive
agglomeration benefits of urban common space, [Fennell] floats the idea of using ‘performance zoning’ as a means of favoring land uses that will produce positive impacts or spillovers to a particular neighborhood or to the City.”). The concept of performance outcome zoning as advocated by Foster and Iaione might also be transferrable to outer space. See id. at
313–14 (“Zoning permits would be based not on a particular type of land use but rather on
the basis of particular targeted outcomes using performance metrics by which the positive
impacts of that land use on communities can be assessed.”).
472. Id. at 340–41.
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assembling uses in a single area of a celestial body, perhaps through
performance zoning, and then occupants of that zone would have to be
willing and able to collaborate.473 Assuming those obstacles can be
surmounted, it is not clear how either of these approaches will overcome
the exclusion problems associated with any proposal that excludes some
users.
D. Lotteries or Tradable Credits
Having a lottery or an auction of “ownership rights,” or establishing
a system of tradable credits like under the Clean Air Act’s acid rain
provision,474 or under the prior appropriation doctrine for allocating use
rights to a quantity of water, might be ways to lessen the equitable
problems with the prior proposals, none of which is sensitive to the
interests of non-developed countries.475 While an auction theoretically
would open up the market in development rights to others than the large
spacefaring nations, in practice one would expect that only they would be
able to effectively bid on and then secure those rights.476 However, the
idea of tradable credits might work.477
Under an outer space trading system, participant nations, “regardless
of [their] space-faring capacity, would be allocated a certain number of
lunar mining credits. The credits would allow the holder to mine a certain
tonnage of natural resources on the moon during a given period.”478 The
credits could apply to the amount of the resource a participant was
allowed to mine, regardless of location, or could be tied to a particular
plot of land on a celestial body.479 Participants could buy and sell their
credits to other participants.480 The openness of the process would create
an incentive for all countries, regardless of their “spacefaring
473. See id. at 342.
474. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651a–7651o (2012).
475. See Coffey, supra note 29, at 137; DiMaria, supra note 28, at 434; Reinstein, supra
note 1, at 90.
476. Cf. Reinstein, supra note 1, at 92 (“The auction occupies the middle ground between
laissez faire privatization of space development and a belief that space is the equal birthright
of all humanity.”).
477. See Taylor, supra note 31, at 279 (“Tradable allowances are more cost-effective, generate more innovation and facilitate greater global participation than any other resource management strategy. Thus, tradable allowances offer the most promising solution to the tragedy
of the space commons.”).
478. Coffey, supra note 29, at 138.
479. Id.; see also Edwin W. Paxson, III, Sharing the Benefits of Outer Space Exploration:
Space Law and Economic Development, 14 MICH. J. INT’L L.J. 487, 514 (1993) (“[E]ach country would be allocated a certain amount of lunar mining credits, which would allow the holder
of the credits to engage in mining certain tonnage of natural resources on the [m]oon for a
given period.”).
480. Coffey, supra note 29, at 138.
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capacities.”481 Two additional features make this an appealing approach.
The first of these, “tonnage limits,” will encourage countries to “make
careful choices in where and what to mine,” assuring that valuable
resources will still be there for countries that begin mining later, like
developing nations.482 The other, a sunset provision, should prevent
hoarding and speculative purchases.483
The approach “would allow developing nations to benefit from
space exploration and exploitation fairly, without giving them control
over an international regime.”484 Another advantage, other than
determining the amount of allocable credits, is that there would be no
need for an international central authority, because participants will run
the market.485 Coffey proposes linking the concept of tradable permits to
an exclusive economic zone so that “[w]hen a nation exercises its credits
on land, that land will become the exclusive economic zone of that
nation,” but would allow others to pass through the zone “as long as they
do not disturb it or take resources from it.”486 However, her approach
comes close to conflicting with the prohibition against appropriating
celestial resources.
Yet, there are potential problems even with this promising approach.
For example, there is still a need for some international organization to
allocate mining credits and to determine the methodology for any
allocation, especially how to assure that non-spacefaring nations benefit
in some way.487 Some form of international oversight will be needed to
“ensure that nations adhere to the rules and do not exceed their allotted
tonnage.”488 There is an unresolved question whether commercial mining
enterprises would be able to buy credits not only from their own country,
but from other countries.489 Then, there is the question of whether space
resources may legally be considered personal property, requiring a new
international agreement to clarify that “celestial resources may legally
belong to those who extract them.”490 Tradable credits would also need
to be anchored by a permit, again raising the need for an administering
481. Id. The worry is that these countries might try and develop a profit distribution system
for resources they neither undertook the risk or cost of developing that benefits them. Id.
482. Id.
483. Id. The sunset provision might also help to control how much actual mining activity
occurs at during any given time period. Coffey, supra note 29, at 138.
484. Id.
485. Id.
486. Id. at 145.
487. Id.
488. Coffey, supra note 29, at 139.
489. Id. at 138 (“Since credits would be bought and sold among nations, it is unclear what
role private actors such as corporations would play.”).
490. Id. at 139.
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agency.491 To prevent over-consumption of permitted resources, a “timelimited” permit based on something like the prior appropriation doctrine
giving the first appropriator superior rights over any later appropriator
might be a way to curb over-consumption, but might disadvantage nonspacefaring countries who would come later to the market.492
Therefore, tradable development credits—absent Coffey’s
modification—is largely consistent with international law, and could
assure equitable distribution of the benefits of space development as well
as provide sufficient incentives for development of these resources.
However, the approach may be too administratively encumbered and
difficult to enforce to be worth adopting.
E. Norms as a Management Approach493
Norms are social rules that are promulgated and enforced by the
community to which they apply.494 They come from communities and not
from an outside organization or governmental entity. 495 They provide
“social meaning” for individuals in specific communities and thus
provide the framework or understandings that guide personal behavior.496
491. Id. at 138.
492. DiMaria, supra note 28, at 434. Noting the similarity to water law, DiMaria says that
valuable celestial resources
May eventually become unsustainable without imposing any equitable principles over
a longer period of time. Without sustainable regulations in place as early as possible,
space could eventually become saturated, excluding future parties from use and exploration by allowing exclusionary rights to prior appropriators. Although it may seem
farfetched to prepare a legal regime with such a distant future in mind, a lack of similarly forward thinking led to the present dilemma by leaving outer space property
rights vague while the technology to obtain such rights ripened.
Id. at 439 (internal footnote omitted).
493. The descriptive portions of the text in this Section about norms and some of the supporting footnotes are drawn from my article. See Hope M. Babcock, Assuming Personal Responsibility for Improving the Environment: Moving Toward a New Environmental Norm, 33
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 117, 134–42 (2009).
494. See Robert D. Cooter, Three Effects of Social Norms on Law: Expression, Deterrence,
and Internalization, 79 OR. L. REV. 1, 5 (2000) (“[A] social norm is an obligation backed by
a social sanction. . . . [An] ‘obligation’ . . . [is] a statement about what people ought to do,
such as pay taxes and clean up after their dogs. . . . [A] social sanction . . . [is a] punishment
imposed, not by state officials, but by ordinary people, such as shunning a litigious lawyer or
refusing to deal with a law firm that organizes hostile takeovers.”); Richard A. Posner & Eric
B. Rasmusen, Creating and Enforcing Norms, with Special Reference to Sanctions, 19 INT’L
REV. L. & ECON. 369, 369 (1999) (“A norm is a social rule that does not depend on government for either promulgation or enforcement.”).
495. Pearl, supra note 243, at 1039.
496. Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Social Meaning of Environmental Command and Control, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 191, 200 (2001).
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They function as
nonlegal rules or obligations that certain individuals feel compelled to
follow despite the lack of formal legal sanctions, whether because
defiance would subject them to sanctions from others (typically in the
form of disapproval, lowered esteem, or even ostracism) or because
they would feel guilty for failing to conform to the norm (a so-called
internalized norm).497

Concern about esteem is especially important in close-knit groups, which
makes norms unlikely to have any effect on the disparate entities that
might engage in developing outer space.498 However, if conditions were
appropriate for the activation of norms in outer space, it is conceivable
that a norm favoring an equitable distribution of space resources could
arise.
Ellickson’s study of Shasta County, California, demonstrates how
norms that originate within a close-knit community can efficiently
manage a CPR.499 His theory revolves around the baseline rule that
“property rights—be they communal or individual—should be clear and
well-known among community members.”500 Besides the absence of any
close-knit community in outer space, the fact that property rules in outer
space are neither clear nor well known would seem to undercut the
application of norms as a management tool in that environment.501
Thus, norms work as a means of controlling individual behavior
when individuals see themselves as part of a particular group.502 When

497. Ann E. Carlson, Recycling Norms, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1231, 1238 (2001); see also Alex
Geisinger, A Group Identity Theory of Social Norms and Its Implications, 78 TUL. L. REV.
605, 608 (2004) (“The sanctions can be based on shame or some other type of social ostracism.”). “In rational actor terms, violating a social norm imposes a cost on the violator that
can tip the cost-benefit balance in favor of conformity with the norm.” Carlson, supra, at
1239.
498. David R. Karp, The New Debate About Shame in Criminal Justice: An Interactionist
Account, 21 JUST. SYS. J. 301, 313 (2000) (“Repeated interactions give rise to habits. They
are perceived by the actors and become expectations in the sense of predictions or anticipations of behavior . . . [E]ach actor feels constrained to live up to the expectation, partly out of
a feeling that the other will be irritated, offended, or disappointed if the expectation is not
fulfilled.”); Michael P. Vandenbergh, Order Without Social Norms: How Personal Norm Activation Can Protect the Environment, 99 NW. U.L. REV. 1101, 1105 (2005) (“Social sanctions
will not change the individual payoff because the individual will either act in isolation or in a
setting with insufficient iterative relationships or information exchange to enable social norm
sanctioning to occur. . . . [S]ituations in which the individual’s actions are not observable by
others and situations in which the actions are observable but occur in non-close-knit groups
as loose-knit group situations.”).
499. Pearl, supra note 243, at 1039.
500. Id.
501. Cf. id.
502. Geisinger, supra note 497, at 632.
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this happens, individuals identify with and assimilate the group norm,
replacing individual behavior with “group-guided behavior.”503 To the
extent that “[i]nformal norms and private ordering seek to identify
circumstances that combine the benefits of the unmanaged commons—
freedom—with the benefits of privatization—efficiency,” they offer “an
appealing degree of autonomy, efficiency, and freedom.”504 But, as in the
case of the users of Pearl’s “Ogallala Aquifer,” there is no “close-knit
group” of actors in outer space, “no shared workday affairs[,] . . . and the
population of users is too large to enable each to sanction the other.”505
Hence, norms as a management approach in outer space, while consistent
with international law, inexpensive to administer, implement, and
enforce, and capable of responding to inequitable situations, seem
unlikely to take hold in that environment.
F. The Public Trust Doctrine (PTD) as a Gap Filling, Place-Holding
Management Approach506
The PTD offers both an approach for managing an open access
commons and a gap-filling tool until a regulatory regime is adopted.507
The doctrine is based on the idea that the “sovereign holds certain
common properties in trust in perpetuity for the free and unimpeded use
of the general public.”508 The public’s right to access and use trust
resources is never lost, and neither the government nor private individuals
can alienate or otherwise adversely affect those resources unless for a
comparable public purpose.509 The resources the doctrine protects “have

503. Id.
504. Pearl, supra note 243, at 1039.
505. See id. at 1061.
506. Parts of the descriptive portions of this Section about the PTD and some footnotes are
drawn from articles I have written on the doctrine. See generally Hope M. Babcock, Is Using
the Public Trust Doctrine to Protect Public Parkland from Visual Pollution Justifiable Doctrinal Creep?, 42 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (2015); Hope M. Babcock, Grotius, Ocean Fish Ranching,
and the Public Trust Doctrine: Ride ‘Em Charlie Tuna, 26 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3 (2007); Hope
M. Babcock, The Public Trust in Public Art: Property Law’s Case Against the Private Hoarding of “Pubic Art,” 50 CONN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (on file with author); Babcock,
supra note 11.
507. See, e.g., Babcock, supra note 11, at 664–75 (advocating the use of the doctrine to
protect migrating wildlife, discussing inadequacies of current federal and private law, and the
capacity of the doctrine to adapt to changing societal needs); Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust
Doctrine in Natural Resources Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471,
556 (1970) (arguing the PTD could achieve environmental goals until the legislation caught
up.).
508. Babcock, supra note 11, at 674.
509. See Hope M. Babcock, Should Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council Protect
Where the Wild Things Are? Of Beavers, Bob-o-Links, and Other Things that Go Bump in the
Night, 85 IOWA L. REV. 849, 889–98 (2000) (summarizing salient aspects of the PTD).
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long been part of a ‘taxonomy of property’ [that recognizes] the division
of natural wealth into private and public property.” 510
“The doctrine places on governments ‘an affirmative, ongoing duty
to safeguard the long-term preservation of those resources for the benefit
of the general public,’”511 thus limiting the sovereign’s power on behalf
of both present and future individuals.512 It directs the government to
manage trust resources for public benefit, not private gain.513 It applies to
private as well as public resources and is used to preserve the public’s
access to CPRs.514 Government agencies have the non-rescindable power
to revoke uses of trust resources that are inconsistent with the doctrine.515
This effectively places a permanent easement over trust resources that
burdens their ownership with an overriding public interest in the
preservation of those resources.516 However, trust resources can be
alienated in favor of private ownership, if the alienation will still serve
the public’s interest in those resources and not interfere with trust uses of
the remaining land.517 The PTD, therefore, protects the “people’s
common heritage,”518 just as Article 11 of the Moon Treaty protects outer
space as part of the common heritage of mankind.519
510. Michael C. Blumm & Mary Christina Wood, “No Ordinary Lawsuit”: Climate
Change, Due Process, and the Public Trust Doctrine, 67 AM. U.L. REV. 1, 44 (2017).
511. Babcock, supra note 11, at 675; see also J. Peter Byrne, The Public Trust Doctrine,
Legislation, and Green Property: A Future Convergence?, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 915, 918
(2012) (“Public trust rights are understood to precede and constrain legislative action to a
larger extent than do private property rights.”).
512. Babcock, supra note 11, at 675–76.
513. Id. at 676.
514. Lloyd R. Cohen, The Public Trust Doctrine: An Economic Perspective, 29 CAL. W.L.
REV. 239, 275 (1992) (“Any body of law will be fuzzy around the edges; that [cannot] be
helped. But the notion of an evolving unbounded set of communal rights—whether they are
constitutional or common law, procedural or substantive, in all public and private property
strips clarity, certainty, and predictability from the very core of the [PTD].”).
515. Babcock, supra note 509, at 892.
516. See id. at 893 (“One cannot construct a common law canon more offensive to the
notion of absolute private rights in property than the [PTD].”); see also Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v.
Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892) (“The State can no more abdicate its trust over property in
which the whole people are interested . . . so as to leave them entirely under the use and control of private parties . . . than it can abdicate its police powers in the administration of government and the preservation of the peace.”).
517. Michael C. Blumm & Aurora Paulsen Moses, The Public Trust as an Antimonopoly
Doctrine, 44 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 17 (2017).
518. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court of Alpine Cty., 658 P.2d 709, 724 (Cal. 1983)
(“The public trust is more than an affirmation of state power to use public property for public
purposes. It is an affirmation of the duty of the state to protect the people’s common heritage[,] . . . surrendering that right . . . only in rare cases when the abandonment of that right is
consistent with the purposes of the trust.”); Christopher C. Miller, Note, To the Moon & Beyond: The United States and the Future of International Space Law, 35 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L
L. REV. 121, 132 (2012).
519. Moon Treaty, supra note 120, art. 11.
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The doctrine also appears to be infinitely malleable. Original uses of
the doctrine were restricted to only that “aspect of the public domain
below the low-water mark on the margin of the sea and the great lakes,
the waters over those lands, and the waters within rivers and streams of
any consequence,”520 and covered only traditional uses of those lands,
like fishing and navigation.521 Over time, the scope and application of the
doctrine broadened to protect more public resources and different uses.522
Thus, the doctrine expanded to protect new trust resources, such as dry
sand beaches, inland lakes, groundwater, dry riverbeds, and wildlife,523
and passive uses of those resources, like scientific study. 524 The original
link to navigable water and tidelands disappeared.525 Supporters of the
520. Sax, supra note 507.
521. Babcock, supra note 11, at 678–79.
522. Id.
523. Id.; see also Blumm & Moses, supra note 517, at 20 (“[T]he PTD has grown in several
somewhat surprising ways, extending antimonopoly protection beyond tidelands and beyond
traditional public uses while reinforcing the principle of non-alienation of natural resources.”).
524. See, e.g., Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971) (holding that the PTD
protects environmental and ecological values); Lamprey v. State, 53 N.W. 1139, 1143 (Minn.
1893) (recognizing public recreation rights as being within the scope of the PTD, being the
first state to do so); Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47,
54 (N.J. 1972) (“We have no difficulty in finding that, in this latter half of the twentieth century, the public rights in tidal lands are not limited to the ancient prerogatives of navigation
and fishing, but extend . . . to recreational uses, including bathing, swimming and other shore
activities. The [PTD], like all common law principles, should not be considered fixed or static,
but should be molded and extended to meet changing conditions and needs of the public it
was created to benefit.”); Raritan Baykeeper Inc. v. City of New York, 984 N.Y.S.2d 634,
634 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings Cnty. 2013) (first citing 795 Fifth Ave. Corp. v. City of New York,
205 N.E.2d 850 (N.Y. 1965); and then citing Williams v. Gallatin, 128 N.E. 121 (N.Y. 1920))
(holding that the use of a municipal park for leaf composting was inconsistent with the aesthetics or activities typically associated with recreation and, therefore, alienated park resources in violation of the PTD, and finding the activity could only be authorized by the Legislature exercising “properly conferred” authority, and enjoining the facility’s operation until
acted upon by the Legislature).
525. See, e.g., Save the Welwood Murray Mem’l Library Comm. v. City Council, 263 Cal.
Rptr. 896, 904 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (invoking the PTD to block conversion of a public library
to improve public access to nearby commercial areas); Big Sur Props. v. Mott, 132 Cal. Rptr.
835, 837 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976) (revoking permit to cross public parkland to access private
property); Paepcke v. Pub. Bldg. Comm’n of Chi., 263 N.E.2d 11, 14–15, 19 (Ill. 1970) (allowing conveyance of one percent of Washington Park for a middle school and recreational
facilities leased to the Chicago Park District only after showing that public rights in remaining
parkland protected and use was for public purpose); Williams, 128 N.E. at 121–23 (invalidating a ten-year lease of part of Central Park for a museum for impermissibly diverting park
resources without the state legislature’s approval); Brooklyn Park Comm’rs v. Armstrong, 45
N.Y. 234, 243 (N.Y. 1871) (disallowing a sale of parkland due to the city’s trust obligations);
Ellington Constr. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 549 N.Y.S.2d 405, 414 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989)
(prohibiting the re-conveyance of parkland for redevelopment); Ackerman v. Steisel, 480
N.Y.S.2d 556, 558 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) (ordering removal of city sanitation equipment
from a park); Hoffman v. Pittsburgh, 75 A.2d 649, 654–55 (Pa. 1950) (upholding an injunction against the sale of a public square for development based on the PTD); In re Conveyance
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doctrine successfully advocated that it be applied to “wildlife, parks,
cemeteries, and even works of fine art,”526 while arguing more recently
its application to the atmosphere.527
A doctrine that imposes a perpetual duty on the sovereign to
preserve trust resources, prevents their alienation for private benefit,
assures public access to them, and can be invoked by anyone seems
particularly useful as a management tool in outer space.528 The fact that
public access to trust resources is so central to the doctrine makes it
reflective, not contradictory, of international space law’s bar against
appropriation of outer space and of the principle of space being the
“province of all mankind.”529 It avoids the problems of alienation and
exclusion associated with any of the management approaches associated
with some form of private property and requires neither the creation of a
new administrative authority nor the presence of a close-knit group of
like-minded people.530 Members of the public, both rich and poor, can
invoke and enforce the doctrine as easily as the sovereign.531 It is cost
effective to the extent that no separate apparatus is required to implement
it, and the doctrine has shown itself to be highly adaptable and innovative
as different needs arise.532 It could also fill the gap in international law
with respect to managing celestial property. Therefore, of all the
management approaches studied here, the PTD seems the most suited to
keep order in space until a regulatory regime is imposed.
However, the doctrine provides no incentives for development of
trust resources; rather, it might be used to limit or curtail that
development, making it an imperfect, perhaps even counter-productive
solution by itself to the extent that such development might be

of 1.2 Acres of Bangor Mem’l Park to Bangor Area Sch. Dist., 567 A.2d 750, 751–53 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1989) (blocking attempted transfer of parklands for construction of an elementary school).
526. Erin Ryan, Comment, Public Trust and Distrust: The Theoretical Implications of the
Public Trust Doctrine for Natural Resource Management, 31 Envtl. L. 477, 480 (2001)
(“Scholars and practitioners have responded to Sax’s call and have advocated extending public trust protection to [cultural assets].”).
527. See Blumm & Wood, supra note 510, at 23 (“The basic [Atmospheric Trust Litigation] case applies public trust principles to the atmosphere . . . .”).
528. See Babcock, supra note 509, at 891; Babcock, supra note 11.
529. See Babcock, supra note 509, at 892 (internal footnote omitted) (“Since property containing trust lands is conveyed subject to the doctrine, absolute private dominion over property
impressed with the public trust can never be granted unless it is in the public interest to do
so.”); see also Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892).
530. See Cal. Co. v. Price, 74 So. 2d 1, 21 (La. 1954) (citing N.Y., New Haven & Hartford
R.R. Co. v. Armstrong, 102 A. 791, 794 (Conn. 1918)).
531. See Babcock, supra note 11, at 676–77.
532. See id. at 674–75, 678.
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beneficial.533 Modifying the doctrine to allow limited use of private
property management approaches, like tradable development claims,
might buffer that effect—a form of overlapping hybridity between one
type of property, a commons, and a management regime from another,
private property, enabled by application of the PTD.
CONCLUSION
“Only a legal system that accommodates both the human need for resources and the necessary preservation of mankind’s common heritage
can fulfill these criteria.”534

The future is now with regard to the development of outer space and
its resources—it is no longer a question of whether humans will engage
in these activities, but how soon they will. Technically advanced
countries and private commercial enterprises are probing outer space and
preparing for landing on an asteroid or the moon to extract their
resources.535 Speculators are selling deeds to the moon’s surface and
preparing to exploit the tourism potential that space offers. 536 But, the
legal framework for managing these initiatives is almost nonexistent.537
International treaties came into being before all this activity began in
earnest and national laws that might apply are stunted by jurisdictional
quandaries like the absence of national boundaries in outer space.538
Thus, there is an urgency to figure out how to control what happens in
outer space before its resources are irreparably damaged or permanently
monopolized by powerful countries and individuals.
In the absence of regulation, much of the current debate centers on
what property regime should be applied in outer space.539 The assumption
is that by only allowing private property rights in space, countries and
commercial enterprises will undertake the risks and costs of space
development.540 However, unless international space law changes, it may
prevent this from happening. If it changes, strong management controls
will be necessary to prevent destruction or over-consumption of celestial
resources, as well as monopolization and competitive behavior by
participants, which could lead to hostilities and inequities.

533. See id. at 697–700 (discussing modifications to the doctrine to lessen any controversy
associated with its application).
534. Widgerow, supra note 22, at 518.
535. See Brehm, supra note 1; Reinstein, supra note 1; Ross, supra note 1.
536. See Reinstein, supra note 1; Wasser & Jobes, supra note 98.
537. See Reinstein, supra note 1 at 62–63.
538. See id. at 72.
539. See, e.g., Brehm supra note 1, at 374; Reinstein, supra note 1, at 72.
540. See DiMaria, supra note 28.

BABCOCK FINAL ARTICLE

262

6/20/2019 1:28 PM

Syracuse Law Review

[Vol. 69:191

This Article examines various private property regimes, including
those of less than full fee ownership, to see if any would avoid the conflict
with the international prohibition on appropriation of outer space and its
resources. It concludes that none will because each retains the right to
exclude and each is insensitive to the treaties’ equity concerns. In
contrast, considering outer space to be common is consistent with
international space law in both respects.
Hypothesizing that private property in outer space may yet prevail,
this Article investigates different private property management
approaches, such as the right of first possession, lotteries, and tradable
development rights, to see if any would be cost effective, easy to
implement and equitable, and would also prevent over-consumption,
monopolization or the slide into rivalrous behavior. The Article
concludes that each comes up short in some respect. Social norms as a
management tool for property held in common, although compliant with
international law, are also not up to the task. Instead, although ancient,
the PTD, with its malleability, easy and cost-effective implementation
and enforcement, non-consumption principle, and consistency with the
goals that animate international space treaties, seems best suited to the
task of protecting the public’s interests in the global commons that is
outer space as it has done for centuries in Earth-bound commons.
But, as its principal terrestrial use has been to protect trust resources
from development, the doctrine needs some modification to encourage
development of celestial resources. Hence, this Article suggests that
modifying the PTD to allow the application of private property
management tools, like tradable development rights, will not only allow
development, but also will assure that when it happens, it will not be just
profitable for a few, but will also be sustainable and equitable.

